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Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote
and Local Governments
Richard Briffaultt
Twenty-five years ago, in Avery v Midland County,1 the
United States Supreme Court extended the one person/one vote
requirement to local governments. Avery and subsequent decisions
applying federal constitutional standards to local elections2 suggested a change in the legal status of local governments and appeared to signal a shift in the balance of federalism. Traditionally,
local governments have been conceptualized as instrumentalities of
the states.3 Questions of local government organization and structure were reserved to the plenary discretion of the states with little
federal constitutional oversight. In contrast, Avery assumed that
local governments are locally representative bodies, not simply
arms of the states. Avery and its progeny, therefore, imposed new
restrictions on state provisions for the organization of local governments. Commentators have expressed concern that rigid application of federal constitutional principles could deprive states and
localities of the flexibility essential to make local governments responsive to the tremendous diversity of local conditions.5
Has local government structure been federalized by constitutional protection of the right to vote in local elections? Has the

t Professor of Law, Columbia University. My work for this Article was supported by
the research fund of the Columbia Law School alumni.
1 390 US 474 (1968).
See, for example, Kramer v Union Free School District No. 15, 395 US 621 (1969);

Cipriano v City of Houma, 395 US 701 (1969); Hadley v Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 US 50 (1970); City of Phoenix v Kolodziejski, 399 US 204 (1970);
Hill v Stone, 421 US 289 (1975).
3 See, for example, Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv L Rev 1057

(1980).
" Hunter v City of Pittsburgh, 207 US 161 (1907), best exemplifies this traditional
position.
5 See, for example, Tom C. Clark, Symposium-One Man-One Vote and Local Government: Introduction,36 Geo Wash L Rev 689 (1968); Comment, The Impact of Voter Equal-

ity on the RepresentationalStructures of Local Government, 39 U Chi L Rev 639, 639
(1972) ("the majority of commentators now believe that the voter equality requirement is a
significant obstacle to the effective functioning of many existing forms of local government
and the creation of regional governments"); Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners
Associations, 130 U Pa L Rev 1519 (1982).
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model of local governments as locally representative democracies
supplanted the traditional view of local governments as administrative arms of the state? Certainly, one person/one vote has had a
direct impact on many localities. In just the last few years, lawsuits
premised on the one person/one vote principle have resulted in the
invalidation of New York City's Board of Estimate,6 Chicago's
school decentralization planJ the regional government of the Seattle metropolitan area,8 and the funding mechanism for Southern
California's rapid transit system. 9 Furthermore, hundreds of other
localities now engage in the decennial redrawing of district lines
and the consequent alteration of local political power. In each instance, the extension of the franchise or the enforcement of the
requirement that votes be equally weighted brings local electoral
practices into compliance with the norms of representative democracy that the Supreme Court has mandated for state legislatures.
Nevertheless, the effect of Avery on the balance of federal and
state power in determining local government structure and on the
conceptualization of local government has been less certain and
more complex than these publicized cases suggest. The Supreme
Court has circumscribed the reach of federal constitutional concern, effectively exempting many local governments and many categories of local elections from strict judicial scrutiny. The federalization of local election law has been partial, and the states retain
considerable control over the organization and structure of local
governments.
This Article considers the scope of federal constitutional protection of the right to vote at the local level. It examines the difficulties inherent in strictly applying the notion that an equally
weighted vote is central to representative government-an idea
that emerged from judicial review of the relatively simple legislative arrangements of our national and state governments-to the
byzantine set of institutions known as American local government.
6

Board of Estimate of City of New York v Morris, 489 US 688 (1989). See text accom-

panying notes 242-48.
Fumarolo v Chicago Board of Education, 142 IMl2d 54, 566 NE2d 1283 (1990). See
text accompanying notes 126-31. See generally John M. Evans, Let Our Parents Run: Removing the JudicialBarriersfor ParentalGovernance of Local Schools, 19 Hastings Const

L Q 963 (1992).
8 Cunningham v Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 751 F Supp 885 (W D Wash
1990). See notes 131 and 256 and text accompanying note 258.
9 Southern California Rapid Transit District v Bolen, 269 Cal Rptr 147 (Cal App
1990). This decision was ultimately reversed in Southern CaliforniaRapid Transit District
v Bolen, 1 Cal 4th 654, 3 Cal Rptr 2d 843, 822 P2d 875 (1992) (en banc). See text accompanying notes 150-65.
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Local government is strikingly different from other levels of government, and not simply because local governments are territorially smaller. Local government organization does not abide by the
"plain vanilla" model1 0 characteristic of state or federal government: a single legislative body with general lawmaking powers over
a broad jurisdiction with democratic accountability to the residents
of that jurisdiction. Instead, specialization, fragmentation, overlap,
and boundary change are pervasive characteristics of our local government structure, and they raise considerable conceptual difficulties for resolving questions of representation at the local level.
Local governments are often thought of as little democracies,
providing fora for participation, deliberation and collective action
concerning a wide range of policy matters. But local governments
perform other functions as well. Many thousands of local governments are functionally specialized, limited to providing a particular service or improvement to a discrete subset of the community.
The state effort to give special or exclusive representation in the
governance of these local units to a constituency limited to fee
payors or service recipients conflicts with a view of the locality,
modelled on the upper levels of government, as simply a small
state, democratically responsible to the territorial jurisdiction as a
whole.
Local governments vary in scale, ranging from the neighborhood to the metropolitan region. The large number of overlapping
localities in fragmented metropolitan areas often results in local
governments affecting areas beyond their borders, and having different degrees of impact on residents within their borders, to an
extent far greater than at the state or national level. It is difficult
to match jurisdiction and constituency precisely, or to assure that
all members of the constituency have the same degree of interest
in a particular local government. Claims that particular groups are
over- or underrepresented raise knotty problems of determining
exactly what a fair representation of groups differentially affected
by a particular local government ought to be.
The plasticity of local boundaries presents further questions.
Local governments are regularly created, subjected to territorial or
10"Plain vanilla" comes from Professor Carol Rose's criticism of the use of the federal
Constitution as the standard-or "plain vanilla"-model of a constitution as a basis for
critiquing other constitutions. See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalismfrom the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84
Nw U L Rev 74 (1989). I would echo but modify her criticism to reflect the fact that, in
considering questions of government structure, both state legislatures and Congress are
often accorded "plain vanilla" status.
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functional modification, combined with other localities, or carved
out of pre-existing local entities.1" Who is to participate in decisions concerning local boundary changes? If local residents are
given an electoral role, how ought their votes be counted: as the
votes of individuals in the electorate of the entire area or as the
votes of members of existing communities within the area? There
is simply no analogue concerning representation in questions of
boundary change at the state or national level.
The fundamental premise of federal voting rights law is that
democratic government means government by consent of the governed. As the Supreme Court observed in Wesberry v Sanders,
"[n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a
voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as
' In its voting cases,
good citizens, we must live."12
the Court has
presumed a close nexus of residency within a jurisdiction, the impact of that jurisdiction's government on residents, and the right
to equal representation in the jurisdiction's elections and government. But due to the variety of local pcwers and the complexity of
local structures, the effects of local government actions, even on
residents, are not a simple binary matter of "impact/no-impact."
Local institutional arrangements focusing on service delivery or infrastructure finance, providing for extraterritorial regulation, or
authorizing boundary changes raise difficult questions concerning
what it means to govern and who is governed by a local decision.
In local government cases, the Court has struggled with the relationship between jurisdiction and impact and the implications of
this relationship for voting rights-particularly where a local government has sharply different degrees of impact on differently situated residents within its borders.
A rigid application of the federal constitutional standard for
the protection of the franchise to all local elections could have resulted in close judicial scrutiny of a wide variety of institutional
arrangements central to local government but alien to the state or
federal experience. Instead, the Supreme Court limited constitutional concern to the local government issues comparable to those
found at the state and national levels-the ongoing governance of
general purpose governments. Boundary change, extraterritorial
authority, and many special districts, have been defined as largely

11See,

for example, Joel C. Miller, Municipal Annexation and Boundary Change, in

International City Management Association, The Municipal Year Book 1986 72 (ICMA,
1986).
12 Wesberry v Sanders, 376 US 1, 17 (1964).
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outside the scope of constitutional protection. This has limited the
impact of one person/one vote on many traditional state-authorized local arrangements, preserving considerable flexibility for
state regulation of governance at the local level. In so doing, however, the Court has been unable to develop a consistent analysis of
how differential government impact should affect voting rights and
representation. Rather, the Court has pursued a two-track approach. For one set of local votes, the Court has presumed that all
residents are comparably affected by local government actions, has
strictly scrutinized deviations from one person/one vote, and has
rigidly enforced the federal norm of equal representation. In the
other, the Court has applied a much less stringent standard, has
deferred to state claims that a locality has sufficiently different degrees of impact on those subject to its actions to justify exclusions
from the franchise, and has denied that voting rights have been
abridged. The encounter between one person/one vote and American local governments thus tells us something about both the uncertain conceptual underpinnings of our dominant conception of
representation and the multiple roles local governments play in
American life.
This Article has four parts. Part I examines Avery v Midland
County and the other Supreme Court cases that extend federal
constitutional protection of the right to vote to local elections.
These cases develop and implement the model of local democracy
in its core area-general purpose governments.
Part II considers the Supreme Court's treatment of some local
governments as more akin to private enterprises, and, therefore,
exempt from the rule of local democracy. The distinction benefits
only landowners, and not other groups with special interests in the
quality of particular local services. The lack of a clear principle for
determining which governments are "proprietary" and which are
"governmental" has, at times, made the distinction difficult to apply. Further, the uncertain scope of the proprietary district exception has validated a legal framework in which important public
functions may be broken away from general purpose governments
and vested in special units not subject to local democratic control.
Part III addresses the questions of representation raised by
extraterritoriality, boundary changes, and overlapping governments. Although these issues often involve general purpose governments subject to one person/one vote, the courts have not considered themselves strictly bound to the democratic model. Instead,
the notion of local government as state instrumentality, carrying
out the state's police and general welfare functions at the local
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level, retains vitality in this setting. In these cases, constitutional
protection of the right to vote has been accommodated to the state
power to create local governments and to define and alter their jurisdictions and political constituencies.
Part IV considers subunit representation in local governments
of regional scope. A central thrust of one person/one vote is the
definition of "representation" in terms of population. This may be
an obstacle to the formation of regional governments because small
localities might refuse to join a regional entity unless they are
guaranteed their own distinct voice-larger than their population
might warrant-in the resulting area-wide government.1 3 Moreover, citizen understanding of and participation in government
decisionmaking may be enhanced where regional government districts are coterminous with community or neighborhood lines, even
where neighborhoods differ in population.14 It is difficult to determine whether the equal population rule has, in fact, obstructed the
formation of metropolitan area governments, because few such
governments were considered either before or after Avery. The local aversion to regional government has been sufficiently great that
it is difficult to conclude that one person/one vote alone is responsible for the lack of movement towards regional government. Nevertheless, a doctrine flexible enough to accommodate landowner.ship-based governments and considerable state discretion in the
allocation of the franchise in boundary changes or instances of
overlapping governments has been far more rigid in its refusal to
recognize the possibility of distinctive political subdivision interests in regional elective local governments. Today's metropolitan
areas face political, economic and social problems that transcend
local boundaries. There is a growing need for representative governance structures with the capacity and perspective to address issues of regional scope, while maintaining local units that can continue to focus on matters of community or neighborhood
significance. Thus, I will suggest the need for a fourth model of
local government-regional federation-to supplement the existing
models of local government as local democracy, proprietary enter-

See, for example, Avery, 390 US at 493-94 (Harlan dissenting); Robert G. Dixon, Jr.,
Rebuilding the Urban Political System: Some Heresies Concerning Citizen Participation,
Community Action, Metros, and One Man-One Vote, 58 Georgetown L J 955, 974-84 (1970).
See, for example, Joseph P. Viteritti, The New Charter: Will It Make a Difference?,
in Jewel Bellush and Dick Netzer, eds, Urban Politics New York Style 413, 426 (M.E.
Sharpe, 1990) (discussing lack of coterminality between community service districts and city
council districts).
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prise, and state agency in order to comprehend fully the variety of
roles local governments can play in the American political system.
The Conclusion offers some brief observations concerning the
insights into both the organization of local government law and the
conceptual underpinnings of the one person/one vote doctrine
gained from examining the application of one person/one vote to
local governments. The difficulties of applying the one person/one
vote doctrine to local governments illuminate the multiple functions and sometimes conflicting conceptions of local government at
work in our system and raise questions about the place of the one
person/one vote doctrine itself as a bedrock norm in our theory of
representation.
I.

ONE PERSON/ONE VOTE AND THE MODEL OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY

In a series of cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court subjected local governments to the same constitutional standards of representation and enfranchisement as the
states. The Court required representation on local government
bodies to comply with one person/one vote and subjected restrictions on the local franchise to exacting judicial scrutiny, sustaining
them only if necessary to further a compelling state interest. In
developing the model of local democracy, the Court steered away
from the dizzying variety of local elections and refused to allow the
states to give greater representation to groups the states deemed
primarily interested in a particular government's actions. Instead,
the Court emphasized the extent to which a local government's actions affect the people of the jurisdiction as a whole rather than
any subset of the community; it gave an expansive definition of the
sort of interest in local government action that could be the basis
of an adult resident's claim to the local franchise; and it treated
the state's decision to fill an office or make a decision through a
local election as creating a strong presumption in favor of participation in the election by the entire local electorate.
A.

Avery v Midland County and General Purpose Governments

The Court began the extension of one person/one vote to local
governments in 1968, four years after it had first developed the
principle in the context of elections to state legislatures 15 and the

16Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964). See also Gray v Sanders, 372 US 368 (1963)
(applying one person/one vote to a county unit system of counting votes for party primary
elections of United States Senators and other statewide officers).
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House of Representatives."6 In Avery v Midland County,1 7 the
Court examined the Commissioners Court of Midland County,
Texas, which had been districted to enable a tiny rural minority to
elect a majority of the body's members.18 Three arguments might
have preserved this arrangement: that local governments are not
covered by the equal population principle at all; that even if some
local governments are subject to one person/one vote, the commissioners court is not a legislative body and, therefore, is exempt
from the rule; and that even if federal constitutional standards for
representative bodies apply to the commissioners court, the state
could bias the districting in favor of rural residents because the
county's primary function is to provide services and regulation for
rural areas.

"

Wesberry, 376 US 1.

17 390 US 474 (1968). In 1967, the Supreme Court had considered four cases that raised

districting questions within local governments, but "refused to meet the issue squarely."
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Local Representation:ConstitutionalMandates and Apportionment
Options, 36 Geo Wash L Rev 693, 697 (1968). Two of these cases, Moody v Flowers and
Board of Supervisors 6 Bianchi, were dismissed together on jurisdictional grounds. 387 US
97 (1967). In the other two cases, Sailors v Board of Education of Kent County, 387 US 105
(1967), and Dusch v Davis, 387 US 112 (1967), the Court "reserved the question whether the
apportionment of municipal or county legislative agencies is governed by Reynolds v. Sims,"
Dusch, 387 US at 114, but then "assume[d] arguendo" that Reynolds did apply to local
elections, Sailors, 387 US at 109, 111; Dusch, 387 US at 114, and found that the representation systems challenged in the two cases were not unconstitutional. Sailors concerned a
Michigan system for selecting members of a county school board that the Court deemed
"basically appointive rather than elective." 387 US at 109. Dusch involved elections to a
local council in which all council members were elected at large, but some were required to
be residents of territorial subunits that varied widely in population. The Court found that
the subunits were "'merely [ ] the basis of residence for candidates, not for voting or representation,'" 387 US at 115, quoting Fortson v Dorsey, 379 US 433, 438 (1965); thus, there
was no one person/one vote problem.
"8 The Commissioners Court was composed of five members. One, the County Judge,
was elected at large from the entire county and in practice cast a vote only to break a tie.
The other four were commissioners elected from districts. One district, consisting of the city
of Midland, had a population of 67,906. The other three districts had a total population of
2094. 390 US at 476.
The Texas Constitution provided for the division of the counties of Texas "into four
commissioners precincts" for the election of commissioners but did not provide that districts be of equal population. Avery v Midland County, 406 SW2d 422, 425 (Tex 1966)
(quoting Tex Const, Art V, § 18). The Avery trial court had found that the Midland County
apportionment had been adopted "for political expediency, to maintain the status quo" and
reflected "a gross abuse of... discretion" by the commissioners court. Id at 424-25 (quoting
trial court findings). The trial court invalidated the apportionment. Id. The Texas Supreme
Court agreed that the apportionment was invalid but rejected the argument that either the
federal or the state constitution required districts of equal population, determining that
"the convenience of the people in the particular circumstances of a county may require-and constitutionally justify-a rational variance from equality in population." Id at
428. The Texas Supreme Court required that districting be based on the "number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values." Id.
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The first argument was premised on the traditional view, articulated in Hunter v City of Pittsburgh,19 that localities are juridically mere administrative arms of the state, not autonomous governments. The Supreme Court had reaffirmed just this point in
Reynolds v Sims,2 0 explaining that although representation in Congress could be based on states,2 1 state legislative districts must be
based primarily on population and not on the representation of local governments. As Reynolds noted, citing Hunter, states are
"separate and distinct governmental entities which have delegated
some, but not all, of their formerly held powers to the single national government," but "[p]olitical subdivisions of
States-counties, cities, or whatever . . .have been traditionally
regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by
the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions. '22 As "the fountainhead of representative government in this
country, '2 3 state legislatures must be subject to the equal population principle, but local governments might not be so constrained
since they exist to carry out the state's governmental functions.
The Hunter view of local government as a creature of the state
suggests that a state ought to be able to design local governments
along the lines it deems appropriate to effectuate its purposes. Avery, however, rejected this line of argument. Although the Constitution does not require the states to have local governments, to
make them locally elective or locally accountable, or to grant them
lawmaking autonomy, the Supreme Court found that the states, in
fact, "characteristically provide for representative government-for decisionmaking at the local level by representatives

"9207 US 161 (1907).
377 US 533, 575 (1964).

20

21 Each state regardless of population is represented by two Senators. Each state regardless of population is guaranteed one seat in the House of Representatives. The guarantee of one seat per state means that House district populations will differ somewhat from
state to state. The one person/one vote principle has been interpreted to require strict intrastate equality of district population, not strict interstate district equality.
22 377 US at 574-75. This discussion of the nature of local governments arose in the
context of the Court's rejection of the so-called "federal analogy" as a defense for malapportioned state legislatures. Proponents of the federal analogy argued that when states utilize
the county as a unit of representation in the legislature-designing state senates on a one
county/one vote rule and state lower houses with a minimum of one representative per
county and the remaining seats distributed among counties according to population-they
are simply following the model set forth in the federal Constitution for the structure of
Congress. See id at 571-72. In dismissing the federal analogy, the Court sharply contrasted
the "sovereign" aspect of the states with the distinctly subordinate status of local governments. Id at 574-75.
23

Id at 564.
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elected by the people. '24 In practice, local governments "universally" exist, enjoy considerable "policy and decisionmaking" autonomy, and operate as representative institutions. 25 States that provide for elective local governments must abide by the
constitutional rules for representative democracies. Thus, the
equal population principle applies at the local level. 26
The second argument grew out of an earlier hint by the Supreme Court that one person/one vote might be limited to "legislative" bodies and thus might not apply to "administrative" entities.21 The Texas Supreme Court had determined that the county
commissioners court was essentially an administrative agency, not
a local version of the state legislature. According to the Texas
court, "[t]he primary function of the commissioners court is the
administration of the business affairs of the county. Its legislative
functions are negligible and county government is not otherwise
'28
comparable to the legislature of a state.
The commissioners court blended administrative and legislative powers. It lacked general lawmaking authority, but it was responsible for equalizing tax assessments and setting the tax rate
pursuant to a state formula, conducting elections, letting contracts,
issuing bonds, adopting a county budget, and administering
peacekeeping, public welfare services, roads, and bridges. 29 Many
other local governments do not abide by the tripartite separation
of powers characteristic of the federal and state governments. Local government is marked by a profusion of boards, commissions,
and authorities that combine legislative and executive authority

24 Avery, 390 US at 481.
25 Id.
26 Id. The Court also dismissed

the argument that local majorities are adequately protected by their ability to seek state legislative restructuring of local governments to prevent
malapportionment. One argument for judicial enforcement of the one person/one vote prin-

ciple at the federal or state level is the need for some constitutional rule that prevents a
current legislative majority from manipulating the electoral rules to entrench itself. The
malapportionment of a local governing body is subject to correction by the state. Indeed, in

the aftermath of Reynolds v Sims, the residents of the urban portion of Midland County, or
of other rural-dominated malapportioned counties, could have sought redress from a state
legislature comporting with the principles of equally populated districts and majority rule.
In finding that one person/one vote is a constitutional prerequisite for democratic local gov-

ernments, the Court determined that a properly apportioned state legislature could not authorize a malapportioned local body. Id at 481 n 6.
27 Sailors, 387 US at 108, 110 (referring to the "nonlegislative character" and "adminis-

trative functions" of a county board of education).
26

z'

Avery, 406 SW2d at 426 (citation omitted).
Avery, 390 US at 483.

One PersonlOne Vote
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over various governmental functions.3 0 In some areas there might
be no one local body with broad enough authority to be deemed
the local equivalent of the state legislature.
Avery rejected the effort to confine the one person/one vote
principle to legislative bodies. Instead, the Court catalogued the
commissioners court's powers, found it had authority "to make a
large number of decisions having a broad range of impacts," 3' and,
therefore, held that it must comply with the "one ground rule for
the development of arrangements of local government"-one person/one vote.32
The third argument contended that a county government, unlike a state legislature, could be structured to favor a particular
constituency because that constituency has a particular stake in
the county government's operation. Texas, like most other states,
is entirely subdivided into counties. In a sense, counties appear to
be in the same relation to the state as states are to the nation. But,
whereas only one state government has jurisdiction in any given
state, there was another general-purpose local government in Midland County-the City of Midland. City dwellers in Midland
County received most of their services from, and engaged in collective local decisionmaking through, their own city government. The
commissioners court, although possessing legal jurisdiction over
both city and noncity areas of the county, was in practice the local
government for the rural areas.3 3 According to the Texas Supreme
Court, the functions that fell within the commissioners court's limited jurisdiction-"roads, bridges, taxable values of large land areas-disproportionately concern[ed] the rural areas. 3 4 If representation in the commissioners court were based solely on population,
"[tihe voice of the rural areas [would] be lost for all practical purSO As the Supreme Court noted, local governments "cannot easily be classified in the

neat categories favored by civics texts." Id at 482.
31

Id at 483.

3 Id at 485.
3' Avery, 406 SW2d at 428. As the Texas Supreme Court had determined,
"[tiheoretically, the commissioners court is the governing body of the county .... But
developments during the years have greatly narrowed the functions of the commissioners
court and limited its major responsibilities to the nonurban areas of the county."
1 Id. The county government did wield considerable power over city residents, but
most of those powers were in the hands of officials who were elected on a countywide basis,
with city dwellers enjoying their proportionate share in the county electorate. These officials
included the assessor and collector of taxes, the county attorney, the sheriff, the treasurer,
the county clerk, and the county surveyor. Avery, 390 US at 505 (Fortas dissenting). According to the Texas Supreme Court, "the various officials elected by all the voters of the
county have spheres that are delegated to them by law and within which the commissioners
court may not interfere or usurp." Avery, 406 SW2d at 428.
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Thus, the Texas court concluded that some districting

bias in favor of rural residents was appropriate to assure rural residents effective representation in their own local government.
The United States Supreme Court, however, focused on the
commissioners court's potential to affect all county residents. The
commissioners court may have attended only to its rural constituents, but it possessed authority to make "a substantial number of
decisions that affect all citizens," including city residents. 6 The
Court reversed the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning, seeing in the
commissioners court's concentration on rural matters not a justification for continued rural domination but the baleful consequences
of past malapportionments that gave rural residents the upper
hand in deliberations. 7 The Midland County situation may have
too closely resembled the rural domination of state legislatures,
which Reynolds had so recently and controversially invalidated, to
have been sustained, even though the presence of another local
government that provided city residents with their own general
purpose government could have provided the basis for a different
decision.
The Court left open the possibility that in another setting differences in governmental impact might justify departures from
equal population representation. For "a special-purpose unit of
government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents," those
more affected by the government's decision might be given a
greater electoral voice than those less affected. 8 But, emphasizing
the broad formal powers of the commissioners court over city residents, the Court found that all citizens of the county, including the
city dwellers, were affected by the county unit's powers.39
B. Applying Avery to Special Purpose Elections and Special Purpose Districts
After Avery, a central theme would be the tension between
state efforts to design local governments serving particular local
constituencies (and arranging systems of local voting and representation accordingly), and the claims by other local residents that
they are sufficiently affected by a local unit's action that they too
35 Id.
Avery, 390 US at 484.

"

37 Id.

Id at 483-84.
39 Id at 484.
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ought to be enfranchised or equally represented. How the Court
assessed the extent of the impact of a particular locality's action,
and the nature of the burden of proof it placed upon the state,
would be pivotal in determining whether the state could design local elections or governments accountable to particular
constituencies.
Cipriano v City of Houma40 and City of Phoenix v Kolodziej41
ski considered state laws that limited the vote in municipal bond
issue elections to taxpayers-the vestige of a long history of property-based voting in municipal elections. This tradition reflects
both the role of property owners as providers of the principal
source of local government revenue and the function of municipal
42
governments of providing services to property.
Cipriano involved Louisiana laws that allowed only property
taxpayers to vote in elections called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility. The Louisiana rule effectively
excluded about sixty percent of the city's registered voters from
the bond issue election. 43 No federal constitutional provision requires popular approval of the decision to incur debt, and the bond
issue vote was merely a "limited purpose election" rather than an
election to the city's governing body. Nevertheless, the Court determined that because the right to vote had been granted to some
and not to others, strict scrutiny applied and the restriction could
be sustained only if necessary to promote a compelling state
44
interest.
The Court rejected the city's contention that property owners
had a "special pecuniary interest" in the efficient operation of the
utility system and, thus, a special stake in the outcome of the bond
election. 45 The revenue bond would be financed by charges imposed on utility users, and both property owners and non-property
owners used the utility system and paid utility bills. Although the
profits from the utility system's operations were paid into the general fund of the city and so could be used to reduce the burden on
property owners who paid the taxes that financed city services,
that did not create a sufficiently great distinction between the interests of property owners and the rest of the community.
40

395 US 701 (1969).

41 399 US 204 (1970).
41 See also Hill, 421 US 289 (invalidating Texas requirement of concurrent majorities of
all voters and of taxpayers to approve bond issue).
41 Cipriano, 395 US at 705.
44

Id at 704.

45 Id.
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City of Phoenix was harder than Cipriano46 because the case
concerned an election called to authorize the issuance of general
7
obligation bonds. Arizona, along with thirteen other states, limited the franchise in some or all general obligation bond issue elections to qualified voters who also paid real property taxes to the
municipality. Under Arizona law, property taxes were to be levied
to service this indebtedness. 48 Property taxpayers, thus, would be
directly burdened by the bond issue. Moreover, the general obligation bonds were secured by the general taxing power of the municipality. The bonds were "in effect a lien on the real property subject to taxation by the issuing municipality, ' 49 so that the property
taxpayers were ultimately at risk for repayment of the debt.
Although the Court recognized that "owners of real property
have interests somewhat different from the interests of non-property owners,"5 0 City of Phoenix followed Avery in assuming that
the community-wide consequences of the local vote outweighed
any differences in impact the bond and taxes might have for property owners. The Court looked first to the municipal improvements
that would be financed by the bond issue and found that the benefits would accrue to property owners and nonowners alike. Because
all residents would be "substantially affected" by the outcome of
the election, "presumptively" the Constitution would not permit
the exclusion of qualified electors from the franchise.51
Turning to the financial burden the bonds would impose, the
Court noted that although the nominal source of revenue for debt
service was the property tax, in practice Phoenix had been collecting about half the revenues it needed to repay its debts from other
local taxes, which were paid by nonowners as well as owners of real
property. More importantly, the Court determined that even if all
the revenues to service the debt were to come from the property
tax, that still would not justify the discrimination in the municipal

'6

Cipriano was the only one of the six local government one person/one vote decisions

in the period from 1968 through 1971 in which there was no dissent. Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Fortas dissented in Avery. 390 US at 486, 495, 509 (respectively). Justices Harlan
and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger dissented in City of Phoenix, 399 US at 215. Justices

Black, Harlan, and Stewart dissented in Kramer, 395 US at 634. Justices Harlan and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger dissented in Hadley v Junior College District,397 US 50, 59
(1970). Justices Brennan and Douglas dissented in Abate v Mundt, 403 US 182, 187 (1971).
47 Id at 213 n 11.
48 City of Phoenix, 399 US at 205. The city was legally privileged to use other revenues
for this purpose. Id.
4, Id at 208.
11 Id at 212.
51

Id at 209.
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franchise because "a significant part of the ultimate burden"
would be passed along by residential property owners to their tenants and by commercial property owners to the Phoenix residents
who consumed the goods and services they produced.2 The Court
made little effort to substantiate its postulate that the incidence of
the property tax was borne by the community as a whole rather
than just the taxpayers, but it noted that the parties had stipulated that real property taxes were a cost of doing business for
landlords "and as such ha[ve] a material bearing" on rents. 5 The
Court did not discuss competition in the Phoenix rental market or
the extent to which goods and services produced by Phoenix commercial property owners were consumed within the city rather
than exported. Instead, the Court appeared simply to assume as a
matter of moderately sophisticated common sense that the debt
service burden, like the benefits from new facilities, would be
widely diffused throughout the entire community.
Nor was the Court persuaded by the argument that the general obligation bond was a "lien" on property within the city "in
the sense that the issuer undertakes to levy sufficient taxes to service the bond. '5 The lien theory was predicated on "the risk of
future economic collapse that might result in bond obligations be'55
coming an unshiftable, unsharable burden on property owners.
The Court was unwilling to base a limitation on the municipal
franchise on such apocalyptic reasoning. As in Avery, the Court
would not tolerate the continuation of a longstanding structural
preference for one group within the community-even a group that
might be more interested in or. at risk from government action-in
the local electoral process.
In Kramer v Union Free School District No. 15,56 the Supreme Court again presumed that a local government's action has
a community-wide impact. Kramer involved a New York law that
limited the right to vote in school board elections to the owners or
renters of taxable property in the school district and to the parents
of children enrolled in the district's schools. The plaintiff was an
otherwise eligible voter who had no children, lived with his parents, and neither owned nor leased taxable property.

2

Id at 210-11.

88 Id at 210 n 6.

Id at 212.

Id.

64 395 US 621 (1969).

354
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The Court could have treated the school district as a Hunterstyle state instrumentality rather than as a local organ. In New
York and most other states, education is a subject of plenary state
power. Avery had cited the state practice of according localities
home rule to justify the one person/one vote requirement," but
state control of education is typically unconstrained by any state
constitutional protection of local autonomy. School boards have
limited authority, do not enjoy home rule status, and are generally
subject to considerable oversight by the state.58
Kramer, however, dismissed the relevance of the differences
between a school board and a city or county government. Strict
judicial scrutiny of the limitation on the franchise was required,
not because of "the subject" of the election, but because of the fact
of an election.59 The use of a local election to fill the seats on the
school board made the school board a locally representative body.
The state was not required to provide for an elective school
board,"' but having chosen to make the school board democratically accountable to a local electorate; the state's definition of the
electorate was subject to federal constitutional standards. The disenfranchisement of some adult resident members of the community would trigger close judicial examination.
The state defended its franchise requirement by arguing that
the resulting school district electorate was the portion of the community "primarily interested in" and "primarily affected" by
school board elections-parents and the direct and indirect payers
of the property tax. 1 In general, those who use or pay for, even
indirectly, the district's single service, would have a significantly
greater stake in the operation of the local school system than other
members of the community. Moreover, because of their enhanced
interest, these groups ought to be willing to put in more time and
effort to study school issues, deliberate, and pursue efficient and
effective school policies. Indeed, the parents and payors arguably
had an interest in not having their voice in school affairs diluted
by those lacking a comparably strong connection to the schools.
The Court declined to decide whether a state has a compelling
interest in limiting the local franchise to a "primarily interested"

390 US at 481.
Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School FinanceReform, 24 Conn L
Rev 773, 780 (1992).
" Kramer, 395 US at 629.
Id at 628-29. See also Cipriano,395 US at 704.
'

Kramer, 395 US at 630-32.
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constituency. Instead, the Court found that the state had failed to
align the franchise precisely with the group primarily interested;
that is, the state had not enfranchised all those, and just those,
"primarily interested" in school board elections. The state included those with "a remote and indirect interest in school affairs
and, on the other hand, exclude[d] others who have
a distinct and
6' 2
direct interest in the school meeting decisions.

The Court, however, never defined what constitutes an "interest" sufficient to justify a claim to the franchise in a special district
election. Who had been enfranchised despite "a remote and indirect interest in school affairs?" In a footnote, the Court noted that
"an uninterested unemployed young man who pays no state or federal taxes, but who rents an apartment in the district, can participate in the election."6 s Of course, in City of Phoenix the Court
assumed that property taxes were passed along to just such renters; moreover, the plaintiff in Kramer had argued that he, too, was
affected by the property tax, even though he neither paid it nor
rented taxable property, because property tax levels affect the
price of goods and services in the community.6 In what way, then,
was the "uninterested unemployed young man" actually uninterested if his rent was affected by school district tax levels? Similarly, in the same footnote the Court described the plaintiff as "interested in and affected by school board decisions," 65 without ever
indicating how the plaintiff was affected or what his interest was if
he neither used the school district's services nor paid for them. Although it may be argued that all area residents are intrinsically
affected by the quality of the local elementary and secondary
school system, the Court did not justify its decision in these
terms.6 Instead, the Court's use of the term "interest," and its
contrast between Kramer and his fictional unemployed counterpart, suggests that the relevant interests were subjective states of
mind, rather than objective ties to school board operations.
Kramer was attentive to and concerned about local school affairs.
He was, therefore, "interested." His fictional unemployed counterpart was indifferent when the subject of education came up and
therefore, not "interested." Thus, the state statute had failed to
62 Id
'

at 632.

Id at 632 n 15.

Id at 630.

65 Id.
6 The

Court noted that Kramer had framed his claim to an interest in school board
operations in these terms. Id at 630. But the Court simply stated Kramer's contention of
interest without commenting on it.
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discriminate with sufficient precision when it sought to vest the
school board franchise only in those "interested." Kramer's subjective approach to "interest" would make it impossible to so limit
the franchise if any resident of the community, who is otherwise
eligible to vote, can claim to be "interested" in the subject of the
election.
Unlike the disenfranchisements or dilutions in other cases,
there was nothing especially troubling about the franchise restriction in Kramer. The state had not excluded any traditionally victimized groups, such as women or racial minorities. There was no
entrenchment of a territorial minority whose interests were arguably adverse to the demographic majority, as in the rural-dominated
malapportioned bodies at issue in Reynolds and Avery. There was
no class discrimination, as in the exclusion of nonowners of property or nonpayers of local taxes; the state permitted renters and
propertyless parents to vote in school board elections. By applying
"exacting" review to the franchise limitation in this context,
Kramer underscored the significance of the Court's presumption
that all adult residents of a local jurisdiction are comparably affected by and interested in that jurisdiction's governance.
Arguably, the public school district is a special case. Public
elementary and secondary education is probably the most important locally provided service. Despite formal state control, the
states have generally chosen to entrust substantial administrative
and fiscal responsibilities to local school districts. Local control has
been a highly prized value in elementary and secondary education
and, although local control is often associated with parental control, it has been asserted that a public school system "has a more
pervasive influence in the community than do most other" special
districts.67 But in Hadley v Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, 8 the Court extended one person/one vote to a
district with far less impact on most local residents and further
removed from the traditional core functions of local government-a junior college district.
Hadley concerned the apportionment of the six-member board
of trustees of the Metropolitan Kansas City Junior College District. The junior college district was composed of eight local school
districts. The largest component school district received three of
the seats, even though it had sixty percent of the population base.

67 395 US at 640 n 9 (Stewart dissenting).

" 397 US 50 (1970).
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The other seven districts shared the remaining three seats, although they had only forty percent of the population base. e9
Following Kramer, the Court treated the fact that the junior
college trustees were elected as dispositive. "[A]s a general rule,
whenever a state or local government decides to select persons by
popular election to perform governmental functions," each qualified voter must be entitled to cast an equally weighted vote.70 The
Court left open the possibility "that there might be some case in
which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far
removed from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds [] might not be required. ' 1 But junior college
trustees were governmental officials "in every relevant sense of
that term.

7'

The Metropolitan Kansas City Junior College District was the
first local government the Court examined in a one person/one
vote case that had been created as an aggregation of other, smaller
constituent local units. The Court did not see in the federative nature of the junior college district any justification for a departure
from one person/one vote. The junior college district had resulted
from a local referendum involving the component smaller school
districts, and the trustee board structure was a compromise between the interests of large school districts and smaller ones. More
populous districts were assured their own distinct seats on the
board, whereas the smaller school districts were aggregated into
one election district. But the larger districts received less than
" Missouri law provided for the allocation of seats on the board of trustees based on
"school enumeration," that is, the number of persons between the ages of six and twenty. If
no one of the component school districts had one-third of the total school enumeration of
the junior college district then all six seats would be filled at large. If, however, a district
had at least one-third but less than one-half of the total enumeration, it was entitled to two
seats, with the others filled at large from the other districts. If a district had at least onehalf but less than two-thirds of the enumeration, it received three seats. If a district had
more than two-thirds of the enumeration, it received four seats. For each apportionment,
then, the number of seats allocated to a populous district was at the bottom end of its range.
397 US at 56-57. The Kansas City school district contained approximately 60% of the
school enumeration, so voters in that district could elect three of the six junior college trustees. The remaining seven districts, with 40% of the enumeration, received the other three
seats. Id at 56-57.
The Court questioned but did not decide whether school enumeration figures and not
population could be used as a basis for apportionment. Id at 57-58 n 9.
70 Id at 56. The Court held there were no "judicially manageable standards" to determine the importance of an office or to distinguish for apportionment purposes between "legislative" and "administrative" officials. Id at 55.
71 Id.
72 Id at 56.
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their population share and the smaller districts correspondingly
more, although the extent of deviation was controlled so that
larger districts would never be underrepresented by more than 16
2/3
percent, and the smaller districts would never be overrepresented by more than 16 23 percent more 7 -a far cry from the
malapportionment in Avery where five percent of the population
received seventy-five percent of the seats on the commissioners
court. Some deviation from equal population representation was
inevitable so long as the junior college board was composed of constituent school districts of substantially differing populations and
the constituent school districts were units of election for some
board seats. As Justice Harlan pointed 'ut in dissent, had the state
corrected the underrepresentation of the largest district while still
using school districts as election units and not changing the
board's size, then the largest district would have been
overrepresented. 4
Perhaps the Court was suspicious of a "built-in bias in favor of
small districts, '7 which may have conjured up the pro-rural preference of the apportionment schemes invalidated in Reynolds and
Avery. In any event, the deviation from equality was deemed too
substantial for the general principle of equally weighted votes. The
federative structure of the board and the possibility that the apportionment scheme might have been a necessary inducement to
some of the component districts to join the regional entity were
treated as irrelevant to the constitutional question. In declining to
liberalize the standard of review for federative governments, Hadley limited the options for the representation of constituent units
in regional entities. 6

73 Id at 56-57.
74 Id at 68.
7 Id at 58.
78

A year after Hadley the Supreme Court slightly liberalized its approach to the repre-

sentation of subunits in larger local governments. Abate v Mundt, 403 US 182 (1971), in-

volved the Board of Supervisors of Rockland County, New York. The Board had traditionally consisted of the supervisors of each of the county's five constituent towns. "The result
[had] been a local structure in which overlapping public services are provided by the towns
and their county working in close cooperation." Id at 183. The five towns, however, were
significantly unequal in population. Rockland sought to comply with Avery while continuing
to use the towns as units of election to the Board. The smallest town elected one supervisor
and the other towns became multimember districts. Nevertheless, adherence to town lines
resulted in some deviation from mathematical equality and, thus, overrepresentation relative to population for some towns and underrepresentation for others. The total deviation
from population equality, 11.9%, was greater than any the Supreme Court had upheld since
it had articulated the one person/one vote rule. The Court, however, sustained the plan,
finding that the benefits of respecting town lines, the "long tradition of overlapping func-
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Kramer's and Hadley's stress on the fact of election, rather
than the subject of the election, as the trigger for strict judicial
review; Hadley's view that a junior college district performs governmental functions that require its representation structure to
conform to one person/one vote; and Kramer's expansive definition
of the sort of interest that would give an otherwise qualified local
resident a claim to an equally weighted vote cast considerable
doubt over the validity of restrictions in thousands of other special
district elections. The dissenters in Kramer and Hadley expressed
the fear that the decisions would bar states from limiting special
district electorates to those who receive a district's services or pay
for its operations. 77 The federal norm of full enfranchisement of
the adult residents of the jurisdiction and equally weighted voting
would appear to be applicable to virtually all local governments.
Kramer and Hadley, however, proved to be the high-water mark in
the Supreme Court's treatment of local governments as local democracies. The Court subsequently developed a new model of local
government not subject to these norms, thus permitting the creation and survival of large numbers of local governments with specialized constituencies.
II.

SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND THE MODEL OF PROPRIETARY

GOVERNMENT

There are nearly 30,000 special districts in the United States,
and the special district is our most rapidly growing form of local
government. 78 For voting rights and representation purposes, the

Supreme Court has conceived of some special districts as more like
tions" in Rockland County, and the lack of built-in favoritism for any particular towns justi-

fied the population deviation. Id at 187.
The value of Abate as the basis for a model of local federative or regional government,
however, is uncertain. The Court noted that "because [ ] all governmental entities are interrelated in numerous ways," it would be hesitant to accept the argument that intergovernmental coordination is a sufficient basis for greater use of small unit representation in larger
local governments. Id at 186. Rockland County's "long tradition" was a crucial fact supporting the outcome in Abate. Subsequently, the Court held that a state's interest in respecting
political subdivisions may justify some modest departure from population equality in a state
or local legislative body. But population equality remains the dominant criterion in legislative apportionment and the representation of political subdivisions is quite limited. See Mahan v Howell, 410 US 315, 329 (1973) (16.4% deviation from equality in apportionment

approaches, but does not exceed tolerable constitutional limit).
7

Kramer, 395 US at 640 n 9 (Stewart dissenting); Hadley, 397 US at 61 (Harlan

dissenting).
78 See, for example, David L. Chicoine and Norman Wazer, Governmental Structure
and Local Public Finance 8-16 (Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1985); William G. Colman,
State and Local Government and Public-PrivatePartnerships22 (Greenwood, 1989).
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private enterprises than governments. The Court initially employed this model to exempt from the rigors of strict judicial scrutiny special districts created to aid agricultural development in
sparsely populated areas. These' districts gave landowners control
over governmental subunits with authority limited to the storage,
reclamation, and provision of water for farming. The Court, however, subsequently extended the proprietary model to a district
that provides nonagricultural services, operates in an urban setting, and overlaps general purpose governments.
Although not all special districts have been treated as proprietary governments and many do not utilize landowner voting, the
proprietary cases influence contemporary understandings of local
government. The proprietary model underscores the continuing
power of the idea, undercut in Kramer and the municipal bond
cases, that those who have the primary financial stake in local operations ought to have a controlling voice in governance decisions.
Given the power of the states to generate special districts and to
place government functions in proprietary special districts that
overlap or are coterminous with general purpose governments subject to the rules of democratic representation, it will sometimes be
difficult to determine whether a particular local election will be
subject to proprietary or democratic rules. With the increased reliance on special districts to fund public infrastructure, there may
be a conflict between the imperatives of financing public services
and improvements and the normative commitment to participation
by the community as a whole in decisions concerning the scope and
financing of public facilities.
A.

The Emergence of the Proprietary Model

In the Western states there are more than 700 specialized local
governments created to manage that arid region's scarce water resources.8 0 These governments plan and undertake projects for the
acquisition, appropriation, diversion, storage, reclamation, conservation, and distribution of water and for irrigation. Typically,
these districts may condemn land, issue debt, and impose assess-

7 See, for example, Virginia Marion Perrenod, Special Districts, Special Purposes:
Fringe Governments and Urban Problems in the Houston Area chs 1, 2, 5 (Texas A&M,
1984); John J. Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis 263-65 (Little, Brown, 4th ed
1989).
80 See Tim De Young, Governing Special Districts: The Conflict Between Voting
Rights and PropertyPrivileges, 1982 Ariz St L J 419, 428 table 3 (tabulating irrigation and
water conservation districts in eleven Western states).
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ments on land in the district. The interest on water district debt,
like other municipal bond interest, is exempt from federal income
taxation."1 Most special purpose water districts are governed by locally elected boards of directors, with the franchise granted to the
owners of land in the district and the votes allotted according to
assessed valuation or acreage.82
In Salyer Land Co. v Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District,83 decided three years after Hadley, the Supreme Court upheld a California law providing that only landowners could participate in elections for the governing board of the Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District and that landowner votes would be allotted
according to the assessed valuation of their lands in the jurisdiction. The Court determined that the water storage district, "by
reason of its special limited purpose and of the disproportionate
effect of its activities on landowners as a group,"8 4 fell within Hadley's provision of an exemption from Reynolds for the election of
"certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups,"8 5 that a popular election might not be required. As a
result, the district's voting arrangements were not subject to strict
judicial scrutiny.
The Court in Salyer was markedly more deferential to state
determinations concerning local arrangements and much less protective of the interest of local residents in voting in local elections
than it had been previously. The Court predicated the exception
from the model of local democratic government on the "special
limited purpose" of the water storage district and the "disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners." But neither "special
limited purpose," nor "disproportionate effect" was adequately
defined.
From the perspective of residents dependent on the district's
water, it is not obvious that water storage is a more limited function than a junior college. Indeed, comparing governmental functions is just the sort of standardless exercise that Hadley had
warned against in refusing to hinge the standard of review on the
81 Id at 425.

82 Id at 424 table 1. See also David L. Martin, One Person, One Vote and California's
Water Districts,8 Natural Resources Lawyer 9 n 2 (1973) (tracing history and case law of
California water districts and weighing the needs of private utilities against the interests of
the public).
3 410 US 719 (1973).
" Id at 728.
85 Id at 727-28, quoting Hadley, 397 iS at 56.
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"importance" of an office.8 6 Furthermore, although the California
water storage district legislation established a fairly tight nexus
linking receipt of water, assessment for water project costs, and the
local vote, 7 the Court did not explain how the water district arrangement differed from the service-payment-franchise relationship in Kramer. Much as nonparents and nontaxpayers may be affected by the operations of a local school board, water storage
district residents as well as landowners may be affected by district
actions. Indeed, the Salyer litigation was apparently triggered by a
decision of the district's board that resulted in the flooding of
lands where nonowner residents lived.8 8
Salyer broke from Kramer and the municipal bond cases in
assuming that the "economic burdens of district operations" were
the sole interest that would support a claim to the franchise.8 9
Moreover, even within the sphere of economic burdens Salyer departed from City of Phoenix in focusing only on those who paid
district charges and assessments. The Court did not consider
whether those costs might have been passed on to district residents
who were the lessees of the district's landowners.9 0
In Kramer the Court had subjected the statutory linkage of
service usage, payment, and function to strict scrutiny and assumed that district actions had sufficient impact on residents, in
addition to users and payors of a district's service, that their exclusion from the franchise could not survive exacting review. In contrast, the Court in Salyer took a comparable linkage of usage, payment, and function, and, without considering whether district
actions might have broader impacts on district residents, proceeded to exempt the franchise restriction from strict scrutiny. It
sufficed that the state had rationally concluded that the landowners who bear the burden of district costs should be given control
over district governance.9 1

86

397 US at 55.

87 The district's revenues came only from landowners, either in assessments against

land or in water charges. A delinquency in payment of an assessment became a lien on the
land, and "residents qua residents" bore none of the district's economic burdens. Salyer,
410 US at 729.
Id at 737-38 (Douglas dissenting).
89 Id at 729.
00 See Salyer Land Co. v Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 342 F Supp 144,
150 (E D Cal 1972) (three-judge court) (Browning concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(lessees are "equally interested in the cost of the district's projects, for this expense will be
passed on to them by express agreement or in the form of increased rentals").
" Salyer, 410 US at 731.
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Salyer's more liberal standard of review of the restricted local
franchise suggests a different model of local government than the
one seen in the cases in the line from Avery through Hadley.92
This is apparent in three ways. First, the notion of a local government as a small polity, with local political institutions representative of the local citizenry and providing an opportunity to voice
concerns, protect interests, and participate in the determination of
political issues that affect the community, was utterly absent from
Salyer. That may have been because there was no community to
speak of in the Tulare Lake Basin district. Local government as
self-government by local residents is generally associated with
urbanness and the greater degree of shared interests or common
needs for public services or regulatory authority that stem from
concentration of population. But only fifty-nine adults lived on the
district's 193,000 acres, and they were primarily employees of the
four agribusinesses that owned most of the district's land." The
district was a rural area whose population was far below the minimum necessary to incorporate a municipality. As the Supreme
Court emphasized, "[t]here are no towns, shops, hospitals, or other
facilities designed to improve the quality of life within the district
boundaries, and it does not have a fire department, police, buses,
or trains."9 5 Although the Court used this description of a sparsely
populated agricultural area to suggest that the district lacked "normal governmental" authority, the paucity of "towns, shops, hospitals, or other facilities" indicates not an absence of governmental

" In Associated Enterprises v Toltec Watershed Improvement District, 410 US 743
(1973), a companion case decided the same day as Salyer, the Supreme Court sustained a
Wyoming law that limited the franchise in the referendum for the creation of a watershed
improvement district to landowners and provided that votes representing a majority of the
acreage affected were necessary to approve a district. Like California water storage districts,
Wyoming watershed districts are financed by assessments against the benefitted lands. The
Court found that the district was "a governmental unit of special or limited purpose whose
activities have a disproportionate effect on landowners within the district." Id at 744. The
Court noted that the statute authorizing the establishment of watershed districts, with the
restriction on the referendum electorate, "was enacted by a legislature in which all of the
State's electors have the unquestioned right to be fairly represented." Id. In Avery and
Kramer the Court had sharply dismissed the relevance of a state legislature elected on the
basis of universal adult suffrage and equal population representation in determining the
constitutionality of local government representation or suffrage provisions. Avery, 390 US at
481; Kramer, 395 US at 628.
Salyer, 410 US at 723.
California requires a population of 500 registered voters as a precondition for a municipal incorporation. Cal Govt Code § 56043 (West 1983 & Supp 1993).
11 Salyer, 410 US at 729.
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power for the district's governing board but the lack of a community within the district appropriate for self-government.
Second, the absence of a local political community may have
made it easier to see the water storage district as a creation of the
state intended to address the problem of water management in the
Tulare Lake Basin. The three-judge court that initially heard
Salyer had applied strict scrutiny and found that the state had a
compelling interest-"the development of its water resources."
The court found that limiting the vote to landowners was necessary to further this interest because under state law district operations were financed by assessments against land, and it was
"doubtful if the District would have been formed unless the persons paying the expenses could control them." 96 The state, however, could have imposed the water storage districts without local
consent as long as the assessed landowners benefitted from district
operations and were given a fair opportunity to challenge their
particular assessments. 7 The state also could have addressed the
water storage problem directly through a state agency financed by
state revenues and operated by state officials, thus obviating the
need for any local consent or any local participation in district
management.
To survive strict scrutiny, a local landowner-financed and local
landowner-controlled district created with the consent of local
landowners must be necessary to address the agricultural water
management problem. Placing control directly in the hands of
those most directly affected by the district's operations may increase the likelihood that the district will operate effectively and
efficiently to secure the interests of local landowners. But given the
inherent incommensurability of voting rights and water- management performance, there is no obvious calculus, under strict scrutiny, for determining whether the enhancement of district per-

9'Salyer, 342 F Supp at 146. See also Schindler v Palo Verde IrrigationDistrict, 1 Cal
App 3d 831, 82 Cal Rptr 61, 66 (1969).
The three-judge court in Salyer did not make a separate determination that weighting
votes according to assessed valuation was also necessary to attain the compelling state interest. The court merely observed that the benefits and burdens to each landowner were in
proportion to assessed valuation "so permitting voting in the same proportion fairly distributes the voting influence." Id. In a separate opinion, Judge Browning agreed that the use of
assessments to finance district operations justified restricting the franchise to those with an
interest in district land, but he found that lessees as well as owners had an interest sufficient
to obtain the franchise. Id at 149-50 (Browning concurring in part and dissenting in part).
He also found there was no compelling interest to support the weighting of votes according
to assessed valuation, and he would have invalidated that provision. Id at 151-52.
See, for example, Fallbrook IrrigationDistrict v Bradley, 164 US 112 (1896).
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formance justifies the discrimination in the provision of the
franchise. By using rational basis review, the Supreme Court reduced the burden on the state to justify its use of a local landowner-controlled entity to address water problems in rural areas.
Salyer thus returns to the state a measure of its traditional
Hunter-style discretion to create and design local governments as
state instruments for the management of localized problems.
Third, perhaps the most striking feature of the arrangement
sustained in Salyer is the allotment of votes according to assessed
valuation. Although property ownership as a qualification for voting has a long history in this country, votes were generally not allotted according to the amount or value of the property owned. In
the municipal bond franchise cases, each property owner or taxpayer cast just one vote. Property ownership signalled that the
voter had an economic stake in the community, and reflected the
belief that the economic independence conferred by property ownership was a source of political independence.9 8 But there was no
assumption that the benefits of property ownership for improved
deliberation and decisionmaking were scaled to the amount of
property a person owned. Indeed, in the Tulare Lake district the
use of assessment-weighted voting actually tended to cancel out
the participation of most landowners because one corporation
owned enough property in the district to command a majority of
the votes, and the four largest owners together garnered approximately eighty-five percent.99 Valuation-based voting could effectively disenfranchise small landowners. With the enfranchisement
of nonresident corporate landowners and the use of valuationbased voting, water storage district voting resembles the voting arrangements of a private corporation or a cooperative. 1°°

98 See, for example, Christopher Collier, The American People as Christian White Men
of Property: Suffrage and Elections in Colonial and Early National America, in Donald W.
Rogers, ed, Voting and the Spirit of American Democracy: Essays on the History of Voting
and Voting Rights in America 19, 22-23 (Illinois, 1992). As Gordon Wood has recently ob-

served, in late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century republican thought, "property was designed to protect its holders from external influence or corruption, to free them
from the scramble of buying and selling, and to allow them to make impartial political judgments." Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 269 (Random House

1991). In other words, the property qualification was seen as a means of creating a disinterested electorate, not a restriction of the franchise to interested voters.
99 Salyer, 410 US at 735 (Douglas dissenting). Indeed, there had not been an election
for several decades. Id.
100 See Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., Self-Government By District: Myth and Reality 93
(Hoover Institution, 1976) (describing California's rural water districts as user cooperatives).
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Salyer's acceptance of the proprietary model of local government was tacit, not express. Although the Court emphasized the
close nexus of financial burdens and the franchise, the Court did
not actually liken the district to a private corporation or cooperative. The sense of the opinion is that in a rural area without a local
political community the state could discharge its responsibility for
dealing with agricultural water management through an entity controlled by the owners of the lands that would finance and benefit
from the state's arrangements.
Salyer left lower courts confused. Some interpreted the case
expansively and permitted states to limit the franchise in a special
district to landowners whenever landowner payments are the primary source of district revenues. 10 1 Other courts read Salyer narrowly, finding that Kramer's strict scrutiny, rather than Salyer's
more relaxed review, still framed the inquiry in local government
voting cases. For these courts, Salyer concerned the supply of
water to agricultural land, and Kramer still governed for spebial
districts operating in urban areas or providing services for households rather than agriculture.10 2 These courts also followed City of
Phoenix's analysis of economic burdens and found that assessment
payors were not disproportionately affected by a special district if
the district also collected user charges or if the burden of assessments was passed along to other area residents through rents and
the prices of goods and services. 103
10 decided eight years after Salyer,
In Ball v James,:
the Supreme Court expanded Salyer's reach and fully established the
model of the proprietary government exempt from the requirements of local democratic representation. Ball, however, was no
clearer than Salyer in indicating when the proprietary model
applies.
101See, for example, Phillippart v Hotchkiss Tract Reclamation District 799, 54 Cal
App 3d 797, 127 Cal Rptr 42, 43-44 (1975); Simi Valley Recreation & Parks District v
LAFCO of Ventura County, 51 Cal App 3d 648, 124 Cal Rptr 635, 655-57 (1975); Chesser v
Buchanan, 193 Colo 471, 568 P2d 39, 41 (1977) (tunnel improvement district).
10' See, for example, Choudhry v Free, 17 Cal 3d 660, 131 Cal Rptr 654, 552 P2d 438,
442-43 (1976) (district with 100,000 urban residents exempted from Salyer); Johnson v Lewiston Orchards IrrigationDistrict, 99 Idaho 501, 584 P2d 646, 649-50 (1978) (district located almost entirely within the City of Lewiston and principally engaged in providing domestic water to residents of Lewiston exempt from Salyer). See also Wright v Town Bd. of
Town of Carlton, 41 AD2d 290, 342 NYS2d 577 (1973), aff'd 33 NY2d 977, 353 NYS2d 739
(1974) (water district to serve the most populated areas of the town).
101 See, for example, Choudhry, 552 P2d at 442-43; Johnson, 584 P2d at 649-50; In re
Extension of Boundaries of Glaize Creek Sewer Dist. of Jefferson Co., 574 SW2d 357, 363
(Mo 1978); Wright, 342 NYS2d at 581.
104 451 US 355 (1981).
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Ball concerned the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, a water reclamation district in central
Arizona. Like the Tulare Lake Basin district, the Salt River district stores and delivers water to landowners within the district's
borders. The district is managed by a locally elected board, with
only landowners permitted to vote, and their votes weighted according to the extent of their holdings. 10 5 The Salt River district,
however, differed from the Tulare Lake Basin district in the nature
of the community served, the extent of its powers, the source of its
financing, and its overall impact.
Although the area was originally agricultural, at the time of
the Ball litigation the Salt River district was substantially urban,
encompassing nine incorporated municipalities including the city
of Phoenix. 1°6 Nearly half of the land in the district was urban, and
approximately forty percent of its water went to non-agricultural
users. 1°1 In addition to storing and distributing water, the district
generated and sold electric power, and approximately ninety percent of the district's 240,000 electric consumers were residential
customers.1 0 8 Although the statute creating the district authorizes
it to raise money through assessments proportionate to acreage
and to issue bonds secured by liens on the real property in the
district, nearly all of the district's revenues, including the funds for
servicing its debts, came from sales of electricity. 10 9
The Salt River district was, in terms of revenues and expenditures, one of the five largest special districts in the United
States. 10 Even without the formal powers of a general purpose
government, the district, as one commentator recently found, has a
broad impact over the metropolitan area-"vastly more influence
over the lives of the people of Phoenix than do most conventional
governments.""' In Arizona, "water is the linchpin of the uni105Id at 359. Prior to 1969, voting power for district elections was apportioned according to acreage, with owners of less than one acre ineligible to vote. In 1969, owners of less
than one acre were permitted to cast fractional votes in proportion to their acreage. In 1976,
the board of directors was enlarged from 10 to 14 members. The original ten members were
elected from geographic divisions within the district, with landowners voting according to
acreage; the four new members were elected at large, with each landowner in the district
having one vote in the at-large election. The district also had a president and a vice president elected at large on an acreage-weighted basis. Id at 359 n 2.
lo See Comment, Voter Restrictions in Special Districts: A Case Study of the Salt
River Project, 1969 L & Soc Order (Ariz St L J) 636, 658.
107 De Young, 1982 Ariz St L J at 445 (cited in note 80).
10o Id.
'09 Ball, 451 US at 360, 370 n 19.
11 Comment, 1969 L & Soc Order at 649 (cited in note 106).
1

Joel Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New Frontier193 (Anchor/Doubleday, 1991).
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verse," and the district, with its control over water and electricity
prices, juggled the competing demands of urban residents, industry, agricultural users, and recreation. 112 At the time of the Ball
litigation, the district subsidized agricultural water users with revenuesInfrom
the sale of electricity. 113
Ball,
the Supreme Court determined that despite the
Salt
River district's considerable influence over the development of
metropolitan Phoenix, the district "simply does not exercise the
sort of governmental powers that invoke" strict scrutiny of restrictions on the franchise. 1 4 Despite its extensive activities and economic clout, the district's "primary and originating purpose"-the
storage, conservation, and delivery of water-was "relatively narrow." ' 5 The district's power over flood control was merely "incidental" to its primary water function and, thus, "not of decisive
constitutional significance."' "

6

Nor did the district's ability to gen-

erate and sell power broaden the nature of its governmental functions, because "the provision of electricity is not a traditional element of governmental sovereignty ...

and so is not in itself the

sort of general or important governmental function that would
17
make the government provider" subject to one person/one vote.

The Court established the requisite nexus between district impact and the enfranchised constituency by focusing on the contingent liability of the district's landowners. Although most of the
district's revenues came from non-landowners and it was unlikely
that the district would ever have to impose a lien on district lands
in order to repay its debts, the voting landowners "are the only
residents of the District whose lands are subject to liens to secure
District bonds" and the only ones subject to the district's power to
levy acreage-based taxes."" The Court acknowledged that nonlandowners would be affected by district operations, but held there
was no requirement that the enfranchised group "be the only parties at all affected by the operations of the entity."" 9
Ball crystallized the model of the proprietary local government. According to the Court, the district was only a "nominal"

112 Id.

...DeYoung, 1982 Ariz St L J at 445-46 (cited in note 80); Comment, 1969 L & Soc
Order at 660 {cited in note 106).
"" Ball, 451 US at 366.
115 Id at 367.
11

Id at 367 n 12, citing Salyer, 410 US at 728 n 8.

Id at 368..
118 Id at 370.
119 Id at 371.
'"
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public entity. It had a sufficiently "public character" that it could
avoid state taxes, sell tax-exempt bonds, condemn property within
its borders, and not be subject to the state's regulatory oversight of
public utilities. 120 But the district's "public character" was purely
formal; it was "essentially" a "business enterprise, created by and
chiefly benefiting a specific group of landowners."' 21 In fact, the
district had two kinds of business-like relationships. The district
sold water and electric power to area residents. But the mere fact
that these consumer-residents were affected by the district's business activities did not give them a claim to representation in its
governance."2 The district, however, also had "investors"-the
landowners within the jurisdiction whose lands were subject to the
district's power to impose land-based taxation and who might be
at risk for the district's obligations. 2 3 The Court determined that
the state could treat the district like a proprietary enterprise and
vest governance in the landowner-investors.
Local government as business enterprise gave the Court a new
framework for considering questions of local government organization, thereby increasing the discretion accorded the states in the
creation of locally representative public entities. If a local government is a business enterprise, then the organizing principles for
political bodies-universal adult resident enfranchisement and
equal population representation-need not apply. With the proprietary enterprise model as an option, a state may design a local government to be responsive and accountable to just a limited group
within the locality without having to prove that the restriction on
the franchise or the bias in local representation is narrowly focused
on all those interested in the local government and necessary to
the furtherance of a compelling state interest. Moreover, although
based on the notion that the restrictive franchise is justified by the
landowners' stake in the special district enterprise, proprietary
governments are not, in turn, subject to a rigid requirement that
votes actually reflect the extent of a landowner's potential liability.
Proprietary governments may use assessment-based voting, acreage-based voting, or even one owner/one vote for qualified
24
owners.1

120 Id at 359-60, 368 n 14.

Id at 368.
Id at 370.
123Id.
121

2

1
See, for example, Southern California Rapid Transit District v Bolen, 1 Cal 4th
654, 3 Cal Rptr 2d 843, 822 P2d 875, 889-90 (1992) (in a special-benefit assessment district
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The proprietary model is not a simple return to local government as state instrumentality. It validates governance only by
those within the community who can be seen as investors. For a
district with power to impose assessments on land, the investor
group will consist of landowners. Although the Salt River district
landowners did not bear the current economic burdens of the district, they were contingently liable for the district's obligations and
were subject to the district's formal power to tax. In effect, Ball
reversed the assumptions of City of Phoenix. Whereas in the democratic/governmental model, the nominal and contingent burdens
of landowners were not enough to support a limitation on the
franchise because costs were shared by other members of the community, in the proprietary setting contingent liability suffices to
support an exclusive franchise for landowners, notwithstanding the
potentially broad diffusion of costs throughout the district.
B.

Choosing the Democratic or the Proprietary Model

Salyer and Ball cite two criteria for distinguishing proprietary
from democratic local governments: the disproportionate impact of
the district on landowners and the special limited purpose of the
district. Neither criterion is analytically sound. The first*is circular
and the second can be arbitrary. The result has been confusion,
coupled with a modest trend to expand the scope of the proprietary model to encompass special districts created to finance a
broad range of urban infrastructure and public facilities.
1.

Disproportionate impact.

The Supreme Court has provided two methods of assessing
the impact of a local government's action in determining whether
the franchise can be limited to a particular constituency. In the
local democracy cases, those benefitted by the locality's performance of its services (or injured by defective or inadequate performance), and not only those who bear the district's costs, are consid-

with voting limited to commercial landowners, state legislature may adopt differing formulas for the allotment of votes and the calculation of assessments).
A proprietary government may also appoint representatives to its governing board from
internal subunits of different populations without running afoul of the one person/one vote
requirement. See Concerned Citizens of Southern Ohio v Ohio Pine Creek Conservancy
District, 473 F Supp 334, 337-38 (S D Ohio 1977). But see Salyer, 342 F Supp at 146-47
(invalidating election divisions within the Tulare Lake Basin district where assessed valuation differed sharply among the divisions; the Supreme Court did not address the malapportionment in terms of interdivision differences in assessed valuation).
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ered persons affected by or interested in the district's government.
The local democracy cases utilize an expansive definition of economic impact and assume that those who initially pay local government taxes or assessments will pass those costs on to others so
that the incidence of local financing is diffused throughout the
community. The community as a whole is, thus, deemed affected
by the local government. Few, if any, can maintain that they are so
disproportionately affected by local action as to justify a representative scheme that benefits them. Even if landowner property is
subject to liens in the event that the local government is unable to
meet its obligations, the imposition of a lien will be treated as too
remote a contingency to sustain a restriction on the franchise.
The proprietary model's method of assessing impact, as exemplified in Salyer and, especially, Ball, is to consider only those who
bear the economic burdens of the local government's actions, not
those whose sole interest is in its services. This alternative defines
economic burden to include only those who are subject to assessments-ignoring the fees paid by non-landowner consumers of the
district's services and costs passed along to the tenants or customers of landowners, and emphasizing the contingent liability of
those whose lands may be subject to lien, regardless of how prosperous the district is or how unlikely it is that a lien will ever be
imposed.
Thus, whether a district's actions have a disproportionate impact on a landowner constituency will turn on whether disproportionate impact is viewed through a proprietary or a democratic
lens; yet the presence or absence of a disproportionate impact on
landowners is supposed to determine whether the proprietary or
democratic framework is applied. The analysis is entirely circular.
2.

Special limited purpose.

The real work of distinguishing democratic from proprietary
governments, then, must rely upon the notion of a special limited
purpose. Some cases will be easy. Precedent clearly requires that
elections in county and municipal governments and in districts
that provide educational services125 be based on the local democracy model.

""8See also Ball, 451 US at 372 n 1 (Powell concurring) (Hadley and Kramer "reflect
the Court's judgment as to the unique importance of education among the functions of modern local government").
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In Fumarolo v Chicago Board of Education,126 the Illinois Supreme Court recently found that Kramer and Hadley continued to
apply, notwithstanding Salyer and Ball, when it invalidated the
franchise and representation provisions of the Chicago School Reform Act. The Act provided for the creation of local school councils
with a variety of powers for each of the grammar and high schools
in the Chicago school system. 1 27 Each council was to consist of ten
members, with parents of children enrolled in the local school to
elect six of their number, community residents to elect two residents, and local school teachers to elect two teachers.12 In invalidating the exclusion of non-parent residents from the electorate
for most council seats, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that
the councils' role in local education placed them outside the reach
of the Salyer-Ball
exemption and mandated the application of
12 9
scrutiny.
strict
Fumarolo underscores the degree to which the Salyer-Ball exemption is based upon a "proprietary" model of local government
and not just a willingness to focus the franchise and representation
in special districts on the special constituency of the districts. The
proprietary model was unavailable in Fumarolo in part because the
parents, although the primary consumers of local school services,
could not be seen as "investors" in the council. As the court
pointed out, "the cost of operating the community's schools falls
directly or indirectly on' virtually all community residents, for example, property taxes are imposed on all residents regardless of
whether they have children attending the schools."'13 0 It is unlikely

128
127

142 Ill2d 54, 566 NE2d 1283 (1990).
These powers included the hiring and evaluation of the principal, the recommenda-

tion of textbooks and disciplinary and attendance policies, the evaluation of teaching resources, and the review of the principal's expenditure plan. Fumarolo, 566 NE2d at 1295.
128

Id at 1287.

129

In defending the restricted franchise, the Chicago Board of Education contended

that the local school councils were advisory rather than governing bodies. The Court determined that, although the district councils lacked the power to levy taxes or set basic educational policy for local schools, their functions were more than advisory, and the councils had
considerable authority over local school operations. Id at 1295-98.

131Id at 1298. Fumarolo also followed Kramer and Hadley in assuming a pervasive
effect of council operations on all community residents and a presumptive interest of all
residents in educational activities. Id. As a result, "[iut simply cannot be said that the activities and the performance of the local school council have a sufficiently disproportionate effect on those parents with children in current attendance at the public school" to justify the
preference for parents and the discrimination against nonparent residents in representation

on the local school councils. Id at 1298-99. The Court suggested that if a rational basis test
had been applied the preference for parents might have survived, because "there may be a
rational relationship between giving parents of children currently attending the public
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that beneficiaries of special district services can obtain special or
exclusive representation in special district governance where they
do not also bear the economic burdens of district operations. The
proprietary model can only empower landowners or other taxpayers seen to have an economic stake in the "enterprise.""1 '
Even for districts that provide just one or a handful of services
and that have a landowner or taxpayer constituency, Ball and
Salyer provide no theory for distinguishing general governmental
functions from special limited purposes. Rather, the Court has
proffered a laundry list of powers and "normal functions of government"-imposition of ad valorem taxes or sales taxes, enactment
of laws governing the conduct of citizens, and the "maintenance of
streets, the2 operation of schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare
services.

'13

The Court's reference to ad valorem taxation as governmental,
and its treatment of the special districts in Salyer and Ball, which
were financed by special assessments, as proprietary, has led some
lower courts and commentators to treat the taxation/assessment
distinction as critical.133 The similarities of taxation and assess-

ment as indicia of governmental power, however, are greater than
their differences. Both taxation and assessment are coercive. The
assessment, like the ad valorem tax, is a compulsory charge that
can be imposed without the consent of the payor.3'T Moreover, the
assessment has long been widely used by both general purpose and
limited purpose governments to finance the construction and
maintenance of public infrastructure and other public improve-

school an increased role in local educational governance and improvement in the school." Id
at 1299-1300.
M See also Cunningham v Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 751 F Supp 885 (W
D Wash 1990) (district that provides water pollution abatement and public transportation
functions; departure from one person/one vote for geographic reasons not protected by proprietary principle).
13' Ball, 451 US at 366.
13' See, for example, William A. Garton, One Person, One Vote in Special District
Elections: Two Ideas and an Illustration,20 SD L Rev 245, 258-61 (1975) (arguing that the
difference between the power to tax and the power to levy special assessments explains why
the court could reach different results in Cipriano and City of Phoenix, on the one hand,
than it did in Salyer, on the other); Foster v Sunnyside Valley IrrigationDistrict, 102
Wash 2d 395, 687 P2d 841, 850 (1984) (district engaged in the delivery of irrigation water
and the generation of electric power exempt from federal one person/one vote requirement
because "it is not empowered to impose ad valorem property or sales taxes, enact laws governing the conduct of citizens or administer the normal functions of government").
" San Marcos Water District v San Marcos Unified School District, 42 Cal 3d 154,
228 Cal Rptr 47, 720 P2d 935 (1986).
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ments. 13 5 Indeed, by definition, a special assessment can only be

imposed to fund a local public benefit 136 This combination of coercive means and public ends indicates that assessments are as governmental as ad valorem taxation.
Nor is it obvious why "sanitation, health, or welfare services"
are more normal functions of government than the storage and distribution of water. There are more than 3,000 local governments
specially created to address water management functions.13 7 How
can a governmental activity so widespread not be a normal function of government?

3

8

It may be that the existence of private

providers of water undercuts the appreciation of the extent of public water storage and distribution activity," 9 but surely the deter'35 See Eugene McQuilin, 14 The Law of Municipal Corporationsch 38 (Callaghan, 3d
ed, 1987); C. Dallas Sands and Michael E. Libonati, 4 Local Government Law § 24.01 (Callaghan, 1982); Oliver Oldman and Ferdinand P. Schoettle, State and Local Taxes and Finance 412-16 (Foundation Press, 1974). See also Bolen, 822 P2d at 877-78 (citing uses of
special assessment in California to fund construction of drains and sewers, residential subdivisions, gas distribution works, flood control projects, the redevelopment of blighted areas,
and the construction of a transit tunnel).
13' McQuillin, 14 Municipal Corporations § 38.11 (cited in note 135). The owner of
land subject to assessment can require the assessing government to prove that the program
funded by the assessment actually benefits the owner to the extent of the assessment as a
condition for the assessment. Ad valorem taxpayers have no similar right to demand that
taxation be conditioned on special benefits. But the right of assessment payors that payment be limited by benefit does not exempt them from the obligation to pay for a benefit
they would rather not have. Id. See also Garton, 20 SD L Rev at 258-61 (cited in note 133).
137 See Coinan, Public-PrivatePartnershipsat 22 (cited in note 78) (in 1987 there
were 3,056 single-purpose governments with a function concerning water supply, and more
than 5,600 that dealt with either water alone or water in combination with sewage).
13 A survey, conducted by the International City Management Association, of the chief
administrative officers of 3,200 municipal governments-that is, cities and not special districts-found that 77.7% assumed some responsibility for the provision of water. See Robert
M. Stein, Urban Alternatives: Public and Private Markets in the Provision of Local Services 53, 64 (Pittsburgh, 1990) (table 3.5).
The formation of water districts often reflects one of the basic motivations for the creation of any coercive government program-that persons benefitted by an activity be compelled to pay for it. As Hawkins explains,
[i]n the case of land-voting districts, many would argue that since the benefits accrue
only to a small group of individuals the activity should be privately undertaken, but in
water projects such voluntary efforts are not always effective and responsive to the
interests of all who benefit. An example is an irrigation district in which, as more water
is transported to an area and spread over increasing amounts of land, the water table
begins to rise; some individuals will benefit by staying out of the district and will capitalize on the rising water table. When a public entity is formed, free riders share
equally in costs for benefits received.
Hawkins, Self-Government by District at 64 (cited in note 100).
13 Ball summarily dismissed the significance of the Salt River district's power distribution activities in assessing whether the district was a governmental or proprietary government, citing a case involving a regulated private utility and asserting that the provision of
electric power is not "a traditional element of governmental sovereignty." 451 US at 368,
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mination of whether a public service is a normal function of government cannot turn on the absence of private sector alternatives,
lest the role of private security forces, private carting services, and
private schools undermine the "governmentalness" of the traditional governmental functions concerning public safety, sanitation,
and primary education.
In determining whether an entity is a state actor subject to the
constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has placed
considerable emphasis on the formal status of the actor and has
increasingly tended to exempt private individuals and firms from
treatment as state actors even when they perform important functions. It is not clear why the formal status of a political subdivision
should not be comparably dispositive when the local franchise is at
stake. Certainly, as Hadley recognized, it would avoid the inherently arbitrary task of determining which activities a government
undertakes are "normal governmental functions" and which are
not-a task complicated by the Court's disinterest in the positive
evidence that a large number of governments undertake certain
presumptively nongovernmental functions, such as supplying water
and power.
There is no natural or functional distinction between "sanitation, health, or welfare services" and water and power.14 Not surprisingly, lower courts have on occasion experienced difficulty in
determining whether certain functions are governmental or proprietary. Is the provision of sewage disposal or garbage collection an
aspect of the public health function, and thus governmental, or is
it special and limited like water storage and irrigation?1 4 ' What of
government activity concerning transportation? Is road mainte-

citing Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 US 345, 353 (1974). As with water, a sizeable
fraction of municipalities assume some responsibilities with respect to the provision of electricity. Stein, Urban Alternatives at 64 (cited in note 138) (table 3.5; 43.8% of municipalities surveyed have some responsibilities concerning electricity).
"' Indeed, the availability of water and power may have implications for local sanitation and health.
'41
See, for example, Goldstein v Mitchell, 144 Ill App 3d 474, 494 NE2d 914, 920-21
(1986) (Illinois may limit franchise to landowners in drainage district, which has powers to
levy assessments, incur debt, manage erosion and flooding, and collect and dispose of sewage); Lane v Town of Oyster Bay, 149 Mise 2d 237, 564 NYS2d 655 (Sup Ct 1990) (referendum on whether to extend boundaries of sanitation collection district limited to owners of
taxable real property).
When faced with a special district that provided residential water and sewer service and
had the power to pass misdemeanor ordinances concerning those services, a California appellate court determined that the district was neither a proprietary government nor a general purpose government and proceeded to develop its own standard of review that would
permit both residential and landowner voting. Biornestad v Hulse, 229 Cal App 3d 1568,
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nance x42 or tunnel construction 14 or mass transit1 44 more like "sanitation, health, or welfare services" or more like water storage? Can
these questions be meaningfully answered?
Following Ball, lower courts extended the reach of the proprietary model. 14 5 Recently, courts have applied the proprietary model
to special districts created to finance urban infrastructure. The
Florida Supreme Court, for example, sustained a state statute providing for the election, on a one acre/one vote basis, of the board of
supervisors of a community development district. 46 The district is
basically a device for developers to finance streets, drainage, and
sewers on the urban fringe to improve the marketability of their
developments. 47 The Florida court determined that the district's
powers "implement the single, narrow legislative purpose of ensuring that future growth in this State will be complemented by an
adequate community infrastructure.1' 4 The financing of basic
community infrastructure was not an "exercise [of] general governmental functions."' 4 e In effect, financing itself was treated as a special limited purpose, regardless of the nature or extent of the facilities financed. As a result, it was easy to limit the franchise to
landowners "because they are the ones who must bear the initial

281 Cal Rptr 548 (1991) (applying rational basis test to statute that enfranchised nonresident landowners).
142 See, for example, Stelzel v South Indian River Water Control District,486 S2d 65,
66 (Fla App 1986) (Florida may provide for "vote-by-acreage" for the operation of water
control district that also has authority to construct, maintain, improve, and repair roads).
143 Chesser, 568 P2d 39.
144 Southern California Rapid Transit District v Bolen, 235 Cal App 3d 134, 269 Cal
Rptr 147, 155 (1990) ("Public transportation, like public education, is an issue affecting all
citizens."), rev'd 822 P2d 875.
145 See, for example, Goldstein, 494 NE2d at 918 (Ball "significantly expanded"
Salyer); Esler v Walters, 56 NY2d 306, 452 NYS2d 333, 437 NE2d 1090 (1982) (treating
Ball as expanding Salyer, and thus overturning Wright v Town Bd. of Town of Carlton, 33
NY2d 977, 353 NYS2d 739 (1974), 309 NE2d 137, affirming 41 AD2d 290, 342 NYS2d 577
(1973), which had held that restrictions on the franchise in a special district that supplied
drinking water are subject to strict scrutiny, and holding that voting arrangements in a
water district in which it is landowners whose property alone is subject to assessments and
to liens for delinquencies are exempt from strict scrutiny).
14'State v Frontier Acres Community Development District Pasco County, 472 S2d
455 (Fla 1985). The district's powers include the issuance of bonds to finance the construction and acquisition of streets, drainage, and sewers. The bonds would be backed by special
assessments against lands in the district. Id at 456.
147 See generally Perrenod, Special Districts,Special Purposes at 12-43 (cited in note
-79) (discussing ability of developers to create and control urban fringe special districts that
finance new infrastructure but ultimately pass costs on to future residents or annexing
cities).
148 FrontierAcres, 472 S2d at 457.
149 Id.
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burden of the district's costs." 150 If disproportionate impact may
consist in ownership of land subject to assessments and contingent
liability for the district's obligations, and if financing may itself be
a special limited purpose when the funds are provided by assessments, then there is considerable potential for the use of the proprietary model to sustain limitations on the franchise to landowners when the funding of local public infrastructure is at issue.
3.

Proprietary governments in general government settings.

Southern California Rapid Transit District v Bolen nicely illustrates the difficulty of determining whether a particular local
election falls within the democratic or the proprietary paradigm, as
well as the growing use of the proprietary model to justify landowner voting in a general government setting. California authorized the Southern California Rapid Transit District ("SCRTD") to
create special benefit assessment districts to defray part of the
costs of construction of a planned rapid transit line connecting
downtown Los Angeles to North Hollywood. On the theory that
the rail system would specially benefit landowners within a certain
distance of the new rail stations, the SCRTD created two districts
and sought to impose special assessments based on square footage
on commercial parcels and improvements in the districts. 15 1 Under
California law, the assessments were subject to referendum, but
only owners of real property subject to the assessment could vote,
with votes allotted on the basis of the assessed value of the real
152
property in the district.
Must the special assessment election be run on democratic
lines or could the state limit participation in the assessment referendum to landowners? The ten California appellate judges who
heard the case split evenly. The three judges of the Court of Ap150Id. See also Bolen, 822 P2d at 884 (vote on referendum to create special benefit
assessment districts to fund a portion of rapid transit system may be limited to owners of
commercial real property- "The narrow purpose for which the districts are established is
reflected in a voting scheme that limits the franchise to those who will directly and primarly enjoy the benefits of transit station siting and shoulder the reciprocal burden of assessments-owners of commercial property.").
151 The SCRTD originally proposed to impose the assessment on all land in the district,
but the Los Angeles City Council conditioned its consent-to the assessment on the exemption of residential property. Bolen, 269 Cal Rptr at 150-51.
152 Qualified owners could cast one vote for each $1000 of real property in the assessment district. Id at 152. One aspect of the challenge to the property-based franchise was
that assessments would be based on parcel size or floor area whereas votes in the referendum would be based on assessed valuation. Thus, "property owners with the most votes do
not necessarily pay the highest assessments." Id.
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peal, and two of the seven judges of the state Supreme Court,
found the special assessment election controlled by Kramer, Cipriano, and especially City of Phoenix.153 These judges saw the district's function as the provision of transportation, and "public
transportation, like public education, is an issue affecting all citizeng.' 1 54 Thus a restriction on the referendum franchise would be
subject to strict scrutiny. Nor did the special assessment disproportionately affect landowners. As in City of Phoenix, the entire
community would benefit from the facility funded by the assessment. 15 5 Further, these judges assumed that the commercial landowners who pay the assessment will be able to "redistribute the
burden to other commercial residents. '156 Thus, neither prong of
the Salyer-Ball test applied, and strict scrutiny of the franchise
restriction mandated extension of the franchise to others within
57
the assessment districts.1
The five-member majority on the California Supreme Court,
however, framed the case entirely within the proprietary paradigm.
Although they agreed with the lower court and the high court dissenters that public transportation is a general governmental function, the majority stressed the distinction between the transit district, an appointive body, which "of course is invested with and
exercises substantial governmental powers,"' 1 8 and the special assessment districts, which "lack virtually any of the incidents of
government.' 59 Those judges saw the "narrow purpose" of the
special assessment district not as transportation but simply as "the
recoupment of some of the added economic value conferred on
commercial property resulting from its proximity to the transit
stations.' ' 60 The Supreme Court majority then applied the proprietary analysis of disproportionate impact and found the tight
linkage of economic burden and the franchise dispositive. Although
nonvoting residents of the districts, like Southern California residents living outside the assessment districts, would be affected by

Id at i53-57; Bolen, 822 P2d at 895-96 (Kennard dissenting).
15 Bolen, 269 Cal Rptr at 155.
155

Bolen, 822 P2d at 895 (Kennard dissenting).

"5
157

Id at 896. See also Bolen, 269 Cal Rptr at 156-57.
The Court of Appeal considered whether the unconstitutional restriction on the

franchise might be severed from the statutory rapid transit financing scheme but concluded
that the legislature "would not have enacted the special assessment law... without [] some
provision for a referendum election." Bolen, 269 Cal Rptr at 158. The dissenters on the
Supreme Court did not reach the issue.
18 Bolen, 822 P2d at 884 (emphasis in original).
159

Id at 883.

160Id at 884.
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the rail system financed by the assessments, they would "bear no
discernably direct financial burden as a result of the
assessments."' 161
At the heart of the division in Bolen was a disagreement over
whether to determine the "governmental" nature of the special assessment district in isolation or in relation to the general governmental SCRTD. The Supreme Court majority focused exclusively
on the special assessment districts and found them "little more
than formalistic, geographically defined perimeters whose raison
d'etre is to serve as the conceptual medium" for imposing an assessment on those whose property would benefit from the rapid
transit system. 6 2 The special assessment district was a fundraising
device, not a government. Therefore, democratic norms did not apply and the franchise could be limited to those commercial property owners obligated to "invest" in the district through the payment of assessments.
The Supreme Court dissenters agreed that a benefit assessment district "is merely a geographical area within the SCRTD's
borders identified by the Board for the purpose of imposing the
assessment."' 6 3 But they drew the opposite conclusion for the allocation of the franchise. For them, the SCRTD, which created the
assessment districts, imposed and collected the assessments, and
would conduct any assessment referendum, was the relevant governmental body. Following City of Phoenix, a referendum conducted by such a government is subject to the franchise rules of
64
the democratic model.1
In Bolen, then, the analytical indeterminacy that marks the
governmental/proprietary distinction was joined by a comparable
uncertainty over whether to gauge the political effect and governmental role of a special district by looking at the particular district
alone or in tandem with other local governments operating over
the same territory. Ball permits courts to isolate special districts
from the overlapping general purpose governments, although the
Salt River district was certainly more than a mere fundraising device. Given the ability of states to proliferate special districts that
overlap more general urban governments, if those special districts
are examined in isolation, they can be treated as proprietary governments even if their actions have considerable impact on the

,e1 Id at 886.

162 Id at 883.
16$ Id at 894 (Kennard dissenting).
16

Id at 894-95 (Kennard dissenting).
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general governmental functions that are normally subject to democratic control.
Bolen underscores the significance of Ball in extending the
proprietary model from the sparsely populated, exclusively agricultural setting of Salyer, where there may be no general purpose local government with powers adequate to the task,16 5 to metropolitan areas where the service or facility in question could be
provided by a democratically elected government. Ball and Bolen
give the states considerable flexibility for deciding whether democratic rules or landowner control will operate in a particular case,
because the two very different models of government could apply
to substantially similar, albeit formally distinct, local elections. A
referendum on whether to impose an assessment on property to
fund public improvements conducted by a general purpose government must be open to all eligible voters because it is assumed that
the benefits and burdens of the improvement and assessment will
be diffused throughout the jurisdiction. But if the state authorizes
the general purpose government to create a special assessment district to assess landowners for the benefits they will receive from
the public improvements that will be funded by the assessment,
then as Bolen indicates, the assessment district may be treated as
a proprietary government. It appears that City of Phoenix may be
avoided by the creation of a local entity whose sole purpose is to
conduct a referendum, although if a general purpose local government had conducted that election, City of Phoenix would apply.
C.

The Proprietary Model, Federalism, and the Local Vote

As Part I indicates, the Avery-Hadley line is an obstacle to
state efforts to give special or exclusive representation to particular
local constituencies. The reasons for special representation range
from policy (that control by the specially affected constituency
would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of local government
performance) to politics (that the special government could not be
created without the special constituency's consent, and that consent was contingent on the constituency obtaining special repre-

265

In the past, counties, the territorially pervasive local governments, may have lacked

the powers necessary to finance and operate major capital facilities. With the strengthening
of county government in recent years and with the potential for extending broader powers
and administrative capacity to counties today, there should be adequate general purpose
governments in most places and the case for a special exemption from general constitutional
principles concerning voting and representation for districts in sparsely populated areas is
increasingly problematic.
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sentation or control of the local entity). The democratic model of
local government requires strict scrutiny of deviations from the
norm of universal enfranchisement and equally weighted votes. It
departs form the traditional deference to the states with respect to
the design of governmental structures for the delivery of local services. With the presumption of pervasive effects of local government action, strict scrutiny spells the elimination of many traditional forms of local government.
The proprietary model provides a partial escape from the tension between political equality and federalism. By treating some
local governments as governments only in name, and more like
proprietary enterprises in fact, the Supreme Court carved out some
creative space that allows states to design local units serving particular constituencies without directly flouting Avery's extension of
the political equality norm to local governments. Political equality
will be rigidly enforced within "governmental" local governments
while states can have considerable discretion to empower landowner interests in "proprietary" local units. The problem, as in so
many other settings, is the elusive nature of the governmental/proprietary distinction.16 Explicit balancing of incommensurable
equality and federalism concerns has ostensibly been avoided in
favor of sorting localities into general purpose and special purpose
units. But the lack of a clear analytical distinction between general
governmental functions and special limited purposes as well as the
existence of local units like the assessment districts in Bolen that
may plausibly fall into either category suggests that the balancing
has only been subsumed into the deliberations of individual judges
concerning which model to apply.
The infrastructure financing cases, in particular, demonstrate
the limited utility of the federal doctrinal framework in determining whether voting rights will be governed by democratic or proprietary rules. The special assessment and community development
16' The governmental/proprietary

distinction was "abandoned as untenable" in the

field of intergovernmental tax immunities. South Carolina v Baker, 485 US 505, 523 n 14
(1988), citing New York v United States, 326 US 572 (1946). It "proved no more fruitful in
the field of regulatory immunity under the Commerce Clause." Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 543 (1985). In Garcia the Court determined that
the distinction could not be the basis for a limited Tenth Amendment protection of the
states from Congressional regulation. Id at 541-43. "The governmental-proprietary distinction has faded into the background as the principal determinant of local government liability in tort" due to the "the confusion, universally acknowledged, in the judicial attempts to
define what is governmental and what is proprietary." Daniel R. Mandelker, Dawn Clark
Netsch, Peter W. Salsich, Jr., and Judith Welch Wegner, State and Local Government in a
Federal System 455 (Michie, 3d ed, 1989).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[60:339

district devices permit the manipulation of the structure of local
elections and allow states to shift important local decisions from a
democratic to a proprietary setting. Form may dominate over substance when the special district financing mechanism is given priority over the general purpose nature of the facility or service
thereby financed. Given the lack of a clear distinction between
general and special limited purposes, an infrastructure financing
district can be seen as a limited purpose government. Within the
framework of a district whose sole purpose is raising revenue it is
easy to find that the assessment-payers or landowners have a
greater stake in the district's activity than non-paying residents. In
many cases, the only constraint on the state or local ability to shift
from general popular control to landowner elections will be state
law doctrines, such as those that bar the creation of "special commissions" to perform municipal functions167 or that limit the types
of local improvements that can be financed by the special
168
assessment.
State and local governments may rely on special assessment
districts to finance local public improvements for reasons other
than voting rules. Special districts are frequently created to avoidstate constitutional constraints on local taxation or borrowing. e9
State tax and debt limitations often target the ad valorem tax on
real property. Typically, they may apply only to governments that
have the power to impose the property tax, 70 or they may only
limit the property tax and obligations funded by the property
tax." ' Governments without broader taxing authority or a special
assessment that is defined as not a tax may be exempt from these
restrictions on local government fiscal autonomy. 17 2 With the
167 See generally Chester James Antieau, 1 Municipal CorporationLaw § 2.11 (Matthew Bender, 1989).
168 See, for example, Heavens v King County Rural Library District, 66 Wash 2d 558,
404 P2d 453 (1965) (special assessment may not be used to fund a rural library because a
library provides no special benefit to land).
169 See, for example, Chicoine and Walzer, Governmental Structure at 71-72, 79, 220
(cited in note 78).
1"I See, for example, Los Angeles County TransportationCommission v Richmond, 31
Cal 3d 197, 182 Cal Rptr 324, 643 P2d 941 (1982) (Proposition 13 does not apply to special
districts that do not have the power to levy a tax on real property).
171 Mandelker, Netsch, Salsich and Wegner, State and Local Government at 353 (cited
in note 166) (tax limits); id at 347-49 (debt limits); NY Const, Art 8 § 4 (limits on local
indebtedness based on percentages of average full valuation of local taxable real estate); id
at Art 8 § 10 (limits on real estate taxes).
171 See, for example, Solvang Municipal Improvement District v Board of Supervisors
of Santa Barbara County, 112 Cal App 3d 545, 169 Cal Rptr 391 (1980) (Proposition 13's
limits on the property tax do not apply to special assessments.); County of Fresno v Malm-
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spread of tax and debt limitations and of popular resistance to
general tax increases, states and localities have turned to entities
not subject to direct local popular control to undertake large-scale
projects.17 The model of proprietary government preserves to
states and localities the option of using special assessment districts
controlled by developers or commercial landowners to finance
costly capital improvements.
The proprietary model is also a reminder of the widespread
use of local government structures to circumvent direct popular
control and facilitate the implementation of pro-business policies.
Although much of the recent revival of interest in local government has focused on local government as a forum that enables people to participate in political decisionmaking, 174 and to engage in
the deliberative activities that constitute communities, 17 5 much of
the work of local governments, and of the rules of local government
law, concerns the financing and operation of the public facilities
necessary for local private economic activity. 76 Local governments
are economic as well as political units, and they may be devices for
using the coercive power of the state for private economic ends.
Contemporary local governments struggle to attract and retain
businesses,17 7 often by financing the kinds of facilities they believe

strom, 94 Cal App 3d 974, 156 Cal Rptr 777 (1979) (same). See also Sands and Libonati, 4
Local Government Law § 24.01 at 24-2 (cited in note 135) ("special assessments []are usually not subject to the restrictions imposed on general taxes").
173 See, for example, Carolyn Teich Adams, Philadelphia:The Slide Toward Municipal
Bankruptcy, in H.V. Savitch and John Clayton Thomas, eds, Big City Politics in Transition
29, 33-34 (Sage, 1991) (discussing Philadelphia's increased use of independent development
corporations and public authorities to finance large-scale projects; these entities "can borrow
money without having the loan count against the municipality's total indebtedness" and
"can insulate development projects from electoral pressure"); id at 42-43 (use of downtown
special service districts in which downtown business owners pay extra taxes to fund extra
services); M. Gottdiener, The Decline of Urban Politics:Political Theory and the Crisis of
the Local State 283 (Sage, 1987) ("Special service districts, nonelective and quasipublic
agencies, joint business/State commissions and programs emanating from higher levels of
government, have all taken over functions that once were administered by more direct
means of public participation."); Annmarie Hauck Walsh, Public Authorities and the Shape
of Decision Making, in Bellush and Netzer, Urban Politics 188, 188-99 (cited in note 14)
(special authorities in New York are "teeming" and are "more important sources of investment in government-authorized projects than either state or city government").
174 See, for example, Frug, 93 Harv L Rev 1057 (cited in note 3); Clayton P. Gillette,
Plebiscites,Participation,and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 Mich L Rev
930 (1988).
175 See Frank L Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 Fla L Rev 443 (1989).
176 See generally Paul E. Peterson, City Limits (Chicago, 1981).
7 See, for example, Ann O'M. Bowman, The Visible Hand: Major Issues in City Economic Policy 7-8 (NLC Working Papers, Nov 1987) (86% of mayors surveyed identified
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will promote private economic activity within local boundaries.17 8
This local "public entrepreneurship' '17 has affinities with the proprietary model. Businesses are seen as specially interested in and
specially affected by local economic development activity. Moreover, cities and states have sought to create and expand local organizational forms such as the public authority, the public benefit
corporation, the public-private partnership, or the special-service
district8 0 that shift economic development decisionmaking away
from popularly elected bodies to entities that are independent of
direct popular control and look to the business community as their
principal constituency. 8 ' In many cases there is no formal conflict
with the norms of the democratic model of local governance because these institutions may not be elective, may be entirely private, or may be nominally subordinate to democratically elected
city councils or state legislatures. In practice, however, many of
these local government structures tend to shift decisions regarding
economic development outside the realm of one person/one vote.
The development and expansion of the proprietary model mirrors this willingness to give powerful business groups an enhanced
role in local economic development programs. Local governance
and local policymaking are complex mixtures of allocational, redistributive, and economic development activities. The proprietary
model both confirms the place of business-oriented concepts in the
design and function of local governments and signals that federal
constitutional law concerning the right to vote may not be able to
provide a basis for challenging the state and local structures intended to strengthen the institutional role of business and limit
direct popular control over local government decisions.

economic development as one of their three top priorities; 36% said it was their highest
priority); Robin Paul Malloy, Planningfor Serfdom: Legal Economic Discourse and Downtown Development (Pennsylvania, 1991) (discussing the legal, political, and economic implications of public/private cooperation and urban development and revitalization).
178 See, for example, Dennis R. Judd, Electoral Coalitions, Minority Mayors, and the
Contradictionsin the MunicipalPolicy Agenda, in Mark Gottdiener, ed, Cities in Stress:A
New Look at the Urban Crisis 145, 145 (1986) ("Entrepreneurial strategies constitute the
heart of the municipal policy agenda of the 1980s.").
171Malloy, Planning for Serfdom at 10 (cited in note 177).
180 See, for example, 1989 NY Sess Laws ch 282 (McKinney, 1989) (authorizing the
creation of business improvement districts).
181See, for example, Clarence N. Stone, Regime Politics: GoverningAtlanta, 1946-1988
148 (Kansas, 1989); Adams, Philadelphiaat 42 (cited in note 173).
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III. THE

CONTINUING ROLE OF THE STATE INSTRUMENTALITY

MODEL

The proprietary cases indicate, in part, the persistence of the
traditional view of local government as an arm of the state, carrying out state policies locally. Nor are the special districts the only
instance of the continuing power of the state instrumentality
model. Even where general purpose local governments are involved, the Supreme Court has on occasion deferred to state decisions concerning the local franchise. This is most apparent in the
Court's decisions sustaining the power of states to give local governments extraterritorial authority and to determine the extent of
electoral participation in decisions concerning local boundary
change. Deference to state authority to shape the representational
structure of general purpose local governments is also reflected in a
number of lower court cases upholding state statutes that extend
the vote to people with a relatively small stake in local elections. In
each of these situations, although the state statute raised a question concerning discrimination in the availability of the local vote
or the dilution of the local franchise though the unequal weighting
of different groups participating in local decisions, the courts used
tests less exacting than strict scrutiny, thereby giving states a measure of discretion in designing local governance.
A. Extraterritoriality
Many states grant some municipalities powers to provide pub182
lic services and regulate conduct outside municipal boundaries.
One commentator has observed that "[i]ncreasingly, as one of the
efforts to cope with metropolitan problems, local governments are
being given express grants of extraterritorial police powers." 183
These municipal extraterritorial powers may include zoning, prohibition of nuisances, licensing and regulation of business, criminal
law enforcement, and general health and safety regulation."" Extraterritorial powers may advance the interests of the municipality
by allowing it to regulate activities just beyond its borders that
may have direct effects on the health, safety, or development of
the municipality. Extraterritoriality may reflect state policies
18 See generally Frank S. Sengstock, Extraterritorial
Powers in the MetropolitanArea
(Michigan Law School, 1962); Antieau, 1 Municipal CorporationLaw § 5.12 (cited in note
167).
...Antieau, 1 Municipal CorporationLaw § 5.12 at 5-37 (cited in note 167).
18 Sengstock, ExtraterritorialPowers at 52-54 (cited in note 182); Antieau, Municipal

CorporationLaw § 5.12 (cited in note 167).
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designed to facilitate central city expansion and limit the formation of new municipalities on the urban fringe by strengthening the
power of the core city over fringe development and reducing the
incentive of fringe areas to incorporate in order to receive urban
services. Finally, extraterritoriality may be a way of providing necessary regulation and services to fringe areas without the population or resources to support their own municipal government.
From any of these perspectives, extraterritorial authority reflects the state's use of local government to accomplish its own
ends. Moreover, extraterritoriality separates local government
power from local representation. The municipality has direct governmental authority over nonresidents, and the fringe area residents, in turn, are subject to regulation by a government they do
not elect. If the government of the municipality is locally elected,
denying the franchise to fringe area residents subject to extraterritorial authority presents a serious voting rights problem.
Holt Civic Club v City of Tuscaloosa1 8 5 involved an Alabama
law giving the City of Tuscaloosa "police jurisdiction" over a threemile radius outside the city limits without providing a concomitant
extension of the franchise in Tuscaloosa elections to police jurisdiction residents."" Citing Kramer, the police jurisdiction residents contended that their exclusion from the Tuscaloosa franchise
had to be subject to strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court, however, sustained municipal extraterritorial authority without the extension of the franchise by sidestepping the implications for fringe area voting rights. The Court noted
that judicial protection of the right to vote applies only to denials
of "the franchise to individuals who were physically resident
within the geographic boundaries of the governmental units concerned. 1 87 Even under the democratic model of local self-government, a local government is territorially based and as such "may
legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political
processes to those who reside within its borders." 88 The police jurisdiction residents were, of course, not residents of Tuscaloosa.
That Tuscaloosa's actions affected police jurisdiction residents did
not bolster their claim to a vote in Tuscaloosa elections because
185 439 US 60 (1978).
168 Id at 61. Tuscaloosa's extraterritorial authority included the power to enforce its
municipal police and sanitary ordinances; license business, trades, and professions; and collect license fees equal to one-half that chargeable to similar businesses within the city's
corporate limits. Id at 61-62.
Id at 68.
Id at 68-69.
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"[a] city's decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders," yet "no one would suggest that nonresidents likely to be affected by" municipal action "have a constitutional right to participate in the political processes bringing it
about."18 9 Kramer's principle that the disenfranchisement of any
elector interested in or affected by a general purpose local government's action triggers strict scrutiny only applies within that government's borders.
In effect, the Court denied that Holt was a local voting rights
case at all and, accordingly, looked only to see if extraterritoriality
would satisfy the rational basis test. Noting that extraterritorial
arrangements are longstanding and widespread, the Court found
that states could reasonably determine that extraterritoriality satisfies the state's interest in providing "basic municipal services
such as police, fire, and health protection"19 0 on the urban fringe.
Although the state could have used other local government arrangements to serve the urban fringe-such as formation of a
fringe area government or administration by the county-the
Court relied on Hunter v City of Pittsburghto confirm that "the
extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating various
types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon
them"1 9 ' encompasses extraterritoriality. 92
Holt reflects the continuing power of the state instrumentality
model. To be sure, the Court's reliance on formal political boundaries in marking the contours of the local vote is unexceptionable.
Any requirement of enfranchising all persons, including nonresidents, interested in or affected by a local government election
would leave the size of local electorates indeterminate and poten-

289

Id at 69.

11o Id at 74.

Id at 71, citing Hunter, 207 US at 178.
The Court cautioned that a different result might obtain if "a city has annexed outlying territory in all but name, and is exercising precisely the same governmental powers
over residents of surrounding unincorporated territory as it does over those residing within
its corporate limits." Id at 73 n 8, citing Little Thunder v South Dakota, 518 F2d 1253 (8th
Cir 1975). In Little Thunder, the Court of Appeals applied strict scrutiny to invalidate the
South Dakota statutes, which provided that officials of designated "organized counties"
would function as the government for "unorganized counties" that consist mostly of reservation Indians, with only voters in the organized counties voting for the county officials. The
court determined that "the officials of the organized county exercise substantial power over
the affairs of individuals living in the unorganized counties." Little Thunder, 518 F2d at
1258. By contrast, Tuscaloosa lacked "the vital and traditional authorities of cities and
towns to levy ad valorem taxes, invoke the power of eminent domain, and zone property for
various types of uses," in the police jurisdiction, and, thus, extraterritorial regulation was
not tantamount to annexation. Holt, 439 US at 73 n 8.
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tially variable from issue to issue and could erode the connection
between a particular community and its representatives. 193 Residency, or some other objective indicator of presence within the locality, as a prerequisite to the franchise may be "necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community.

' 194

But there

were two formal state-created political boundaries in Holt-the
corporate limits of the City of Tuscaloosa and the extraterritorial
zone. The people in the police jurisdiction were not simply neighbors of Tuscaloosa indirectly affected by the city's decisions but
were, rather, residents of a defined territorial unit subject to a degree of direct city control. As a matter of voting rights jurisprudence, the Court would have had to determine which was the relevant political boundary for assessing discrimination in the
availability of the franchise, the Tuscaloosa city limits or the outer
perimeter of the extraterritorial zone, and, if the latter, consider
whether a compelling state interest justified the limitation on the
franchise to those within the city. Instead, the Court ignored the
presence of two boundaries, and of two possible definitions of residents of Tuscaloosa. It was, thus, able to assume that extraterritorial authority without a concomitant extension of the franchise
posed no local voting rights question.
By severing the voting rights issue from the extraterritorial
authority question, the Court avoided the issue of representation
raised by extraterritorial regulation. This issue runs through many
of the local government voting rights cases: whether a state can
determine that a local government has a differential impact on different groups within the government's territorial jurisdiction and
so structure representation on the local governing body to give a
greater, or exclusive, voice to the group the state determines is primarily affected. The local democracy cases require a very tight
nexus between the franchise and interest in the local government
and assume that a local government's impact is pervasive within
its territory even if it primarily serves a particular constituency or
receives its locally-raised revenues from a specific group. As a result, no limitation on the franchise or overrepresentation of a

193 Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The
Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination,
92 Colum L Rev 775, 793 (1992).
I" Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 343-44 (1972).
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group favored by the state has been sustained for general purpose
governments. 95
Holt would have been a close case if the outer perimeter of the
police jurisdiction had been treated as the relevant local boundary
and strict scrutiny had then been applied to the disenfranchisement of the police zone residents. The City of Tuscaloosa certainly
had less power over the urban fringe than it did over residents
within the corporate limits. The city could not levy ad valorem
taxes, exercise eminent domain, or zone in the extraterritorial
belt.196 On the other hand, the city could enforce municipal police,
sanitary, and business licensing requirements in the zone and collect license fees. 97 Residents of the police zone could have plausibly contended that they were at least as affected by Tuscaloosa as
the nonparents and nontaxpayers were affected by the operations
of the school district in Kramer. Applying the Kramer standard
would have entailed a close consideration of the relationships of
formal jurisdictional authority, differences in government impact
within a jurisdiction, and the right to vote in local elections, with
the burden on the state to justify the exclusion of fringe area residents from the municipal vote.' 9 8 The Court, however, dismissed
the voting rights problem rather than resolve it. Moreover, the
constitutionality of extraterritoriality was determined by an invocation of the state instrumentality model of local government. Federal constitutional protection of the franchise would not require
the elimination of a longstanding and widespread mechanism of
local governance. The selection of the means of providing services
and regulation in the urban fringe-municipal annexation, fringe
incorporation, special district, county government, or municipal extraterritorial police jurisdiction-was a matter for the state. The
dilemma from a voting rights perspective, that some qualified electors could vote for the governing body of a local government and
other qualified electors also subject to direct regulation by that local government could not, was simply ignored.

"' In the proprietary cases, the special limited purpose of the districts, the economic
burdens of the landowner-"investors," and the assumption that those burdens gave the
landowners a disproportionate interest in the special district, permitted the finding of the
necessary franchise-interest nexus. Because extraterritoriality involves general purpose governments, the proprietary model is unavailable.
'"
"7

Holt, 439 US at 73 n 8.
Id at 61-62.

"'
See, for example, Note, Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa: ExtraterritorialsDenied the Right to Vote, 68 Cal L Rev 126, 146-49 (1980) (discussing partial enfranchisement
of fringe area residents).
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Boundary Change1 9

Boundary change is a widespread phenomenon at the local
level. Every year thousands of municipalities annex territory, hundreds of municipalities detach territory, dozens of new municipalities are incorporated, and a handful of municipalities are merged,
consolidated, or disincorporated. 20 The processes of boundary
change have implications for local government voting rights. Do local residents have a right to vote on local boundary changes? If the
residents of one jurisdiction affected by a boundary change are enfranchised but residents of other jurisdictions directly affected by
the same change are not-such as when residents of an area to be
annexed may vote on the annexation but residents of the annexing
city may not-does the discrimination in the availability of the
franchise require a compelling state interest? If the residents of
different jurisdictions affected by the same boundary change are
all enfranchised, does federal constitutional protection of the vote
require a single aggregate majority of all voters, or concurrent majorities of voters within each jurisdiction?
The Supreme Court has directly addressed only the last of
these issues, but the Court's resolution of that question and its approach to extraterritoriality suggest that as a general rule voting on
boundary changes is largely a matter for state determination. In
Town of Lockport v Citizens for Community Action, e1 the Court
considered a provision of the New York Constitution that enables
a county to switch from a weak county to a strong county format,
with a new administrative structure and enhanced regulatory capacity. Such a change requires the approval in a referendum of
concurrent majorities of voters who live in cities and of those who
live outside cities. A proposed charter change for Niagara County
twice won approval of city voters and of a majority of all county
voters, but each time was rejected by a majority of non-city voters
and thus failed. City voters contended that the concurrent majority rule unconstitutionally diluted their votes, but a unanimous Supreme Court disagreed.
Lockport likened the county reorganization, which strengthened the county government and weakened other local units, to

199

This section builds on my previous discussion of some aspects of the right to vote on

local government boundary changes in Briffault, 92 Colum L Rev at 791-805 (cited in note
193).
200 See Joel C. Miller, Municipal Annexation and Boundary Change, in International
City Management Association, Municipal Year Book 1988 59, 64 (ICMA, 1988) (table 1/3).
201 430 US 259, 260-61 (1977).
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"the structural decision to annex or consolidate."202 A decision to
adopt the "strong county" form, like an annexation or a consolidation, could have a differential impact on the "separate and potentially opposing interests" of city and noncity voters. 203 The Court
assumed that in an annexation or consolidation proceeding a state
could require separate consents from the voters of each unit affected by the boundary change. The electorate of each unit could
be given veto power over the annexation or consolidation, even
though the negative vote of a small unit could outweigh the affirmative vote of a larger one or of the two units considered together.20 4
By analogy, New York could require the concurrent approval of
the charter change by different groups of county voters. 0 5
Lockport's indication that a state could require separate consents of the constituent units in an annexation or consolidation is
dictum, but the sense is clear. The Court did not explicitly consider voting rights in boundary change cases, but emphasized the
"wide discretion the States have in forming and allocating governmental tasks to local subdivisions" 20 6 and indicated that it would
defer to a state's determination "that the residents of the annexing
city and the residents of the area to be annexed formed sufficiently
'20 7
different constituencies with sufficiently different interests.
Votes could be tabulated on a separate constituency basis, rather
than across constituency borders. Lockport, however, does not
mandate, as a matter of constitutional protection of the local
franchise, a concurrent majority rule. Lockport cited Hunter v City
of Pittsburgh, which had sustained a state consolidation law that
provided for a single majority of the aggregate of the voters of the
two cities proposed for consolidation, over the protest of the voters
of the smaller city that they were being swallowed up without their
consent.20 8 Lockport and Hunter taken together indicate that the
issue is not one of voting rights but of plenary state authority to

202 Id at 271.
203 Id.
204 Id at 271-73.

105Lockport cannot be read simply as authorizing a supermajority requirement for a
decision that has extraordinary significance for a polity. The Court had previously sustained
supermajority requirements, but only on condition that the supermajority rule not privilege
a particular group because of "group characteristics" such as "geographic location." Gordon
v Lance, 403 US 1, 4 (1971) (sustaining 60% voter approval requirement as precondition for
issuance of bonded indebtedness). The concurrent majority requirement in Lockport, however, turned on geographic location.
"' Lockport, 430 US at 269.
207 Id at 271.
20 Id at 271, citing Hunter, 207 US at 174-79.
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require separate consents of different territorial constituencies or
209
to aggregate all the voters into one constituency.
Lockport and Holt, and the invocation of Hunter in both
cases, also suggest the resolution of the other boundary change voting rights issues. As Holt indicated, constitutional interest attaches
when the state gives the vote to some local residents but not
others. Combined with Hunter's determination that the states
have "absolute discretion" to "expand or contract the territorial
area [of a city], unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality .... with or without the consent of the citizens, or even
against their protest,"21 0 it is apparent that local residents have no
federal constitutional right to have a local boundary change put to
a popular vote. 211 Further, although discrimination in voting rights
will be subject to strict scrutiny once the franchise is provided,
strict scrutiny stops at the local jurisdictional boundary line, and,
as Lockport and Holt indicate, the states will have considerable
discretion in selecting the determinative boundary line.2 1 When
the residents of one jurisdiction are entitled to vote on a boundary
change, but the residents of other jurisdictions affected are not,
strict scrutiny will not apply to this interjurisdictional discrimination.2"" The issue will be treated not as a matter of voting rights
but as a question of state boundary change policy. 2 14 Therefore,
209 See, for example, City of Humble v Metropolitan Transit Authority, 636 SW2d 484
(Tex App 1982) (sustaining scheme for referendum on creation of a metropolitan transit
authority that required the separate consents of some incorporated cities, while combining
other cities into a single election unit).

210 207 US at 178-79.
212See, for example, Carlyn v City of Akron, 726 F2d 287, 290 (6th Cir 1984) (no right

to vote concerning detachment of territory from one jurisdiction and annexation to another); Berry v Bourne, 588 F2d 422, 424 (4th Cir 1978) (no right to vote on annexation).
212 As previously noted, there were two relevant boundary lines in Holt: the city limits
of Tuscaloosa and the outer perimeter of the police jurisdiction. The Court deferred to the
state of Alabama's determination that the city limits were the border for the provision of
the franchise in Tuscaloosa elections. Similarly, there were two relevant boundary lines in
Lockport: the distinction between the city and noncity portions of Niagara County, and the
borders of the County itself. Although the Court treated the reorganization of the county
government as if it were a boundary change, Niagara County had been united as a single
county unit since the beginning of the nineteenth century. A comparison with Avery, 390
US 474, is instructive, because in that case the Court declined the invitation to consider
Midland County as composed of two distinctive units-the city and rural areas-and instead insisted upon treating the County as a single unit.
213 See, for example, St. Louis County v City of Town and Country, 590 F Supp 731 (E
D Mo 1984); Moorman v Wood, 504 F Supp 467 (ED Ky 1980); Murphy v Kansas City, 347
F Supp 837 (W D Mo 1972); Adams v City of Colorado Springs, 308 F Supp 1397 (D Colo
1970), aft'd, 399 US 901 (1970).
214 The state's plenary authority to choose which jurisdictions will be able to vote on a
boundary change does not extend to discriminations .within a general purpose jurisdiction.
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the states have plenary authority to implement policies that encourage or impede various types of boundary changes by determining that the residents of some but not all units affected will get to
vote on a proposed change, much as the state can decide whether
to require concurrent majorities or a single majority from the aggregate local electorate.
The only difficult question concerns secession or detachment
of territory. In justifying a state rule that would require separate
consents of jurisdictions proposed for consolidation or merger,
Lockport noted that "[t]he fact of impending union alone would
not so merge them into one community of interest as constitutionally to require that their votes be aggregated."2 15 Arguably, in a
secession or detachment there is at the time of the vote a single
jurisdiction, and therefore any effort to limit the vote on secession
to just one group in that community-such as the residents of the
area seeking secession-should be subject to strict scrutiny. This
was, for a time, the position of the California Supreme Court.2 16 In
a case involving the secession of a school district from a larger unified school district, the California court reasoned that because secession had an impact on the well-being of the district as a whole,
all voters in the unified school district were entitled to participate
217
in the secession vote.
There are, however, two problems with special treatment for
secession referenda. First, it may be difficult to distinguish a secession from other forms of boundary change. Due to the overlapping
of local governments, a municipal incorporation or municipal annexation of unincorporated territory may have the effect of the detachment of that territory from the county. Typically, the county's
powers to collect revenues or regulate land use and development
will be reduced when unincorporated territory is attached to or be-

State efforts to restrict the vote on an annexation to landowners or to require the separate
consent of landowners have been subject to strict scrutiny and invalidated. See, for example,
Hayward v Edwards, 456 F Supp 1151 (D SC 1977), aff'd as Hayward v Clay, 573 F2d 187
(4th Cir 1978) (where annexing and annexed areas voted separately, approval of voters of
each could be required, but freeholders of annexed area could not be given veto); Mayor and
Council of City of Dover v Kelley, 327 A2d 748 (Del 1974) (statutory and city charter provisions providing for weighting votes in annexation according to assessed valuation of real
estate owned by each eligible voter unconstitutional in the absence of a compelling state
interest).
115

Lockport, 430 US at 271.

Fullerton Joint Union High School Districtv State Board of Education, 32 Cal 3d
779, 187 Cal Rptr 398, 654 P2d 168 (1982).
217 654 P2d at 184-85.
21
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comes a municipality. 218 Conversely, a city may initiate a detachment to rid itself of unwanted territory, thereby displacing a burden to the surrounding county,2 19 or a secession may be just the
first step in a two-step process of shifting territory from one existing municipality to another. 2 0
Second, from a voting rights perspective a secession is not a
unique form of boundary change. The claim to the franchise is
driven by the argument that the disenfranchised group is as interested in and affected by the election as those enfranchised. Annexations and consolidations may have as great an impact on the residents of the areas proposed for merger as a secession or
detachment would on the area that would lose territory. An annexation or consolidation may result in the loss of local autonomy for
a smaller area absorbed into a larger one, 22 ' or may impose new
burdens of service provision or regulation on a jurisdiction required to accept new territory.222 To strictly scrutinize a state decision limiting the franchise in a secession election on the theory
that the residents of the jurisdiction seceded from are as affected
by the outcomeof the referendum as those seeking secession implies the need for the same standard for all other restrictions on
boundary change voting.223 Alternatively, strict scrutiny limited to
restrictions on voting in secession referenda would have the curious effect of providing municipalities with a measure of constitu-

218 See, for example, St. Louis County, 590 F Supp at 736-37; Carlyn, 726 F2d at 289;
Board of Supervisors of Sacramento County v Local Agency Formation Commission of
Sacramento County, 3 Cal 4th 903, 13 Cal Rptr 2d 245, 838 P2d 1198, 1200 (1992), cert
denied, 61 USLW 3645 (1993). See also Marcus v Baron, 456 NYS2d 29 (1982) (a village in
the town of Ramapo, New York, sought to incorporate in order to get out from under the
town's growth control zoning ordinances; the town stood in a similar relation to the village
as a county to a municipality); City of Town & Country v St. Louis, 657 SW2d 598, 612 (Mo
1983) (en banc) (city's annexation of unincorporated area would result in county's loss of
tax revenues and loss of control and planning of developable land). Note that in these cases,
despite the shift of certain powers upon incorporation, newly incorporated areas are still
formally considered within the larger jurisdiction of which they had been a part.
219 See, for example, Village of Beechwood v Board of Elections of Cuyahoga County,
148 NE2d 921, 923 (Ohio 1958).
220 See, for example, Moorman, 504 F Supp at 476-77; West Point Island Civic Ass'n v
Township Committee of Dover, 255 A2d 237, 239-40 (NJ 1969).
221 See, for example, Hunter, 207 US 161.
122 See, for example, Citizens Against Forced Annexation v Local Agency Formation
Commission of Los Angeles County, 32 Cal 3d 816, 187 Cal Rptr 423, 654 P2d 193 (1982)
(residents of City of Rancho Palos Verdes seeking to resist forced annexation of unincorporated territory of Eastview).
.223 See id (applying strict scrutiny to an annexation election and sustaining state statute limiting the franchise to those in the area proposed for annexation on the theory that
the state has a compelling interest in promoting annexation).
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tional protection from the loss of territory but not from the unwanted addition of territory or from merger into another
municipality. 2 4
Although Lockport appears to permit a different rule for secessions, the sense of both Lockport and Holt, and the significance
of the citation to Hunter22 5 in both cases, is that the issue of which
territorial groups are to vote on local boundaries is for the political
judgment of state legislatures. Indeed, the California Supreme
Court recently overturned its previous requirement of strict scrutiny of limitations on the franchise in a secession election, concluding that the rational basis test applies and that the state's interest
in the "logical formation and modification of the boundaries of local agencies" would support restriction of the franchise to the residents of some but not all of the territory affected by a boundary
22 6
change.
The United States Supreme Court's reliance on the traditional
model of state-local relations to resolve the issues concerning voting rights in boundary change decisions may follow from the problematic nature of local boundaries. As Avery indicates, the protection of the local franchise is built on a notion of local government
as democratic self-government, but the concept of self-government
does not dictate who is the "self" that does the governing.2 2 7 Indeed, Avery relies on the states to create local governments and to
give them their powers and territory. To apply strict scrutiny to
the distribution of the vote concerning boundary changes would
inevitably entail a constitutional review of the states' municipal
formation and boundary change policies. But there are no generally accepted principles for determining whether a particular local
government ought to exist, what that unit's geographic dimensions
ought to be, or whether a particular territory ought to be in that or
another local unit. Thus, deference to the states is consistent with
both the lack of a constitutional vantage point for examining state

224 The application of strict scrutiny in secession voting cases would provide the munic-

ipality with only limited protection because, as noted, there is no constitutional requirement
that the state hold any election concerning the boundary change or that the state obtain the
municipality's consent to the secession or detachment. Hunter, 207 US at 179.
225 Hunter discusses the power of the state with respect to municipalities to "expand or
contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal
the charter and destroy the corporation ... with or without the consent of the citizens or
even against their protest." Id at 178-79.
26 Board of Supervisors of Sacramento County, 838 P2d at 1211 (quoting Cal Govt
Code § 56001).

M27
Briffault, 92 Colum L Rev at 800 (cited in note 193).
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municipal formation and boundary change policies 228 and the
traditional jurisprudence of federalism that treats local governments as state instrumentalities and leaves the creation and structure of local governments to the states.
C.

Expanded Electorates

The continued power of the state instrumentality model is
also illustrated by cases involving claims that a state improperly
extended the local franchise to people who are so much less affected by a local government than other voters that their participation unconstitutionally dilutes the votes of those primarily affected. The assertion of unconstitutional overextension of the
electorate has arisen in two settings: overlapping jurisdictions 229
and the enfranchisement of nonresident property owners. 2 0 The

overlapping jurisdiction problem is best exemplified by a series of
cases concerning city and county boards of education in Alabama
and North Carolina, where one school system operates in a city
and a second system operates in the county in which the city is
located. The city residents are primarily served by the city school
system, and they are authorized to vote for the city school board.
In several instances the city residents have been enfranchised in
county school board elections as well. The non-city residents of the
county claimed that the city resident voting in the county school
board elections unconstitutionally dilutes the non-city vote and
thereby threatens to undermine the non-city residents' ability to

The constitutional ban on racial discrimination does provide a basis for invalidating
racially invidious boundary determinations. See, for example, Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364 US
339 (1960). See also City of Pleasant Grove v United States, 479 US 462 (1987) (applying
Voting Rights Act of 1965 to boundary change); Perkins v Matthews, 400 US 379 (1971)
(same).
229 See, for example, Davis v Linville, 864 F2d 127 (11th Cir 1989); Sutton v Escambia
County Bd. of Ed., 809 F2d 770 (11th Cir 1987); Hogencamp v Lee County Bd. of Ed., 722
F2d 720 (11th Cir 1984); Phillipsv Andress, 634 F2d 947 (5th Cir 1981); Creel v Freeman,
531 F2d 286 (5th Cir 1976); Locklearv North CarolinaState Bd. of Elections, 514 F2d 1152
(4th Cir 1975). See also McMichael v County of Napa, 709 F2d 1268 (9th Cir 1983) (challenge by resident of unincorporated area to county-wide vote on a slow growth ordinance
that applied only to the unincorporated area); Collins u Town of Goshen, 635 F2d 954 (2d
Cir 1980) (challenge by residents of water district to town-wide vote on management of
water district, including participation by residents not served by the district); Clark v Town
of Greenburgh,436 F2d 770 (2d Cir 1971) (challenge to right of residents of incorporated
area within town to vote in election for town officers when incorporated area had its own
village government and town primarily served the unincorporated area).
20 See, for example, Bjornestad, 281 Cal Rptr at 558-65; Brown v Board of Commissioners of City of Chattanooga,722 F Supp 380, 397-98 (E D Tenn 1989); Glisson v Mayor
& Councilmen of Town of Savannah Beach, 346 F2d 135 (5th Cir 1965).
228
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govern their own local educational institutions. In the nonresident
property owner cases, local adult resident citizens were enfranchised regardless of whether they owned property, but the
states also extended the franchise to some nonresidents who owned
taxable real property within the community.""
The overinclusion claim presents the issue, latent in Avery
and Kramer, of whether those primarily interested in a local government action have a right to reduce or exclude the representation of others who may be significantly less interested. In so doing,
they underscore the uncertain theoretical foundation of the jurisprudence of local voting. A consistent theme in the local election
cases has been the linkage of franchise and impact. The Supreme
Court's basic premise is that residents of a jurisdiction have an
equal right to participate in the election of their local government
so long as they are comparably affected by that government. The
doctrine breaks down, however, when the local government has different degrees of impact on different residents. In the local democracy cases, the Supreme Court presumed that the local government
had some roughly comparable impact on all residents and therefore mandated the enfranchisement of all otherwise qualified voters. In the overlapping school district cases, however, because of
the existence of two local systems serving different parts of the
community, there was substantial evidence of a significant difference in the impact the county school district had on city and noncity residents.
If the touchstone for representation is some degree of local impact, and the county school board has some modest impact on city
residents, then all residents of the county school district have an
equal claim to the local franchise. But if equality of participatory
rights is based on equality of impact, then giving an equal
franchise to those who are less affected by local action, albeit still
somewhat affected, can be seen as diluting the rights of those
2S
Some of the situations in which nonresident voting has been authorized include: a
seaside resort town in which residents of the surrounding county who owned second homes
in the municipality were enfranchised, Glisson v Mayor & Councilmen of Town of Savannah Beach, 346 F 2d 135 (5th Cir 1965); a special district in which the franchise was granted
to both residents and nonresident landowners, Bjornestad v Hulse, 229 Cal App 3d 1568,
281 Cal Rptr 548 (1991); a Tennessee statute that authorized landowner voting in addition
to resident voting in a city that so provided, Brown v Board of Commissioners of Chattanooga, 722 F Supp 380, 397 (E D Tenn 1989); and a provision of the New Mexico constitution that extends the vote in municipal bond referenda to any person who owns and pays
taxes on property within the municipality and who is otherwise qualified to vote in the
county in which the municipality is situated, Snead v City of Albuquerque, 663 F Supp
1084 (D NM 1987).
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much more affected. Moreover, if all voting rules within general
purpose local governments are subject to strict scrutiny and the
state is required to provide a compelling state interest for all deviations from the tight fit of franchise and impact, then the state
may be unable to justify either the disenfranchisement or the
equal representation of the less affected residents.
The courts that considered the overlapping school districts resolved this dilemma by, for the most part, 3 2 exempting the enfranchisement of the less affected residents from strict scrutiny.
But, while professing to apply a rational basis test and to place the
burden on the non-city residents to demonstrate the irrationality
of the state's enfranchisement of the less affected city residents in
elections for the county-wide school board,2 38 these courts in practice also required the states to prove that the overlying jurisdiction
has some impact on the residents of the underlying included jurisdiction. This requirement of some objective interest of city residents in the operation of county schools has been satisfied when
the city contributes to the financing of county schools, there are
student cross-overs between the two systems, or the two systems
share some facilities.23 4 As a result, many but not all extensions of
the franchise in county school board elections to city residents
have been sustained. The overlapping school district disputes have
generated an unusual series of local voting cases in which both the
state's interest in structuring local governments and the primary
local constituency's interest in avoiding dilution have been weighed
and the disputes have been resolved through a fact-sensitive consideration of the extent of city involvement in county schools.
In the overlapping jurisdiction cases, the city residents were
also residents of the county and, as a result, would have had at
least a prima facie case to challenge their exclusion from county
school board elections. In the nonresident property owner cases,
the challenged voters would have had no constitutional entitlement
to vote where they did not reside.2 3 5 Thus, the need to avoid strict
scrutiny, lest neither the expanded nor the narrower definitions of
the electorate satisfy a compelling state interest, was absent. None-

Locklear, which applied strict scrutiny, is the exception. 514 F2d at 1154.
See, for example, Sutton, 809 F2d at 772; Creel, 531 F2d at 288.
234 The judges that have heard these cases have disagreed over how much of a financial
232

2'3

contribution or how large a cross-over is required to give city residents a significant enough
interest in the county school system to justify their enfranchisement. Sutton, 809 F2d at
773-74; Hogencamp, 722 F2d at 722.
22" Instances of nonresident landowner voting that resulted in litigation are described in
note 231.
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theless, in these cases, too, the courts declined to subject the expanded franchise to strict scrutiny, applied a nominal rational basis test, and looked for some objective indicia of the added voter's
interest in the operations of the local government. Generally, the
courts found that a state could reasonably conclude that property
owners have "an interest in the operation" of the local government."'6 But not all such enfranchisements have been approved.
Unlike residents, who are either in a jurisdiction or not, nonresidents can have fractional interests or tiny holdings of municipal
land. Thus, in one case, the court held that residents could have
theii vote unconstitutionally diluted by the enfranchisement of
nonresidents who own "trivial" amounts of property within the local jurisdiction."'
The expanded electorate cases may be explained in terms of a
bias in favor of the expansion of the franchise, 238 but this fails to
give adequate recognition to the vote dilution claim. The enfranchisement of those without some stake in the community
would reduce the voice of community members in their own local
affairs, interfere with their efforts to assure that their local government is responsive and accountable to their interests, and, ultimately, erode their ability to govern themselves. If democratic
norms apply, the franchise can be extended
only to those with
23 9
some recognized stake in the community.
2"I

Glisson, 346 F2d at 137. See also, Brown, 722 F Supp at 399 ("There is no question

that city property owners, including nonresident property owners, have an interest in the

conduct of municipal affairs, including property taxes, zoning, public services such as sewage
and garbage disposal, and other matters that may affect their property.").
" Brown; 722 F Supp at 399. In Brown the court noted that "as many as 23 nonresidents have been registered to vote on a single piece of property in the city," and that in one
instance fifteen nonresidents were registered as co-owners of a parcel of property assessed at
$100. Id. As a result, it found that the nonresident landowner enfranchisement provision of
the Chattanooga city charter did not further any rational government interest and, therefore, fell afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. The court indicated that a property owner
franchise with a minimum property value provision and a limit on the number of people
who could vote from a parcel would have been sustained. Id.
238 Id at 398 ("Over inclusiveness is a lesser constitutional evil than under inclusiveness."), citing Sutton, 809 F2d at 775.
239 In reviewing these and other cases concerning expanded electorates, my colleague
Gerald Neuman found a rejection of the notion that the constitution provides a "single
conception of a political community that uniquely determines the electorate of each governmental unit." Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are The People". Alien Suffrage in German and
American Perspective, 13 Mich J Intl L 259, 320. Rather, once the "core electorate" composed of "a constitutionally privileged category of citizens" (adult, resident, nonfelonious
citizens) has been enfranchised, id at 313, "government [has] some discretion to supplement
[it] ... with a variety of noninvidiously defined optional electorates, consisting of categories
of persons who have interests implicated in the community's political process," id at 320.
My reading of these cases is fairly close to his, with two slight differences. First, I think I
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The question, then, is who decides who has the necessary interest to support an extension of the franchise? The expanded
electorate cases indicate that the states will be given considerable
discretion to extend the franchise to groups affected by a local government but not constitutionally entitled to vote in local elections.
Such state decisions will be subject, however, to judicial review to
protect the interest in local self-government of those residents
most affected by the dilution that would result from the enfranchisement of those with a much smaller local stake. The principal instances of the expanded electorates grow out of two distinctive features of American local government: the states' practice of
creating multiple local governments with overlapping powers over
the same territory, and the historic close connection between local
government and property ownership.
With overlapping governments, one local government may
have a differential impact on different groups of residents within
its own jurisdictional borders depending on the jurisdiction and
authority of other local governments. Requiring a tight fit between
voting rights and local government impact would impose on local
government a model of jurisdictional separation and electoral distinctiveness that is simply not consistent with current local government arrangements. The overlapping government cases may be
seen as an adaptation of the model of local democracy to the messy
reality of multiple local governments as well as to the traditional
role of the states in structuring these governments.
The nonresident property owner cases are more troublesome,
with their hint of the proprietary model and their evident ancestry
in the preferred position of property in determining political

may be taking the "dilution" claim of the core electorate more seriously. There has to be
some limit on the state's ability to expand the local electorate lest the opportunity for local
self-government be denied to those who are most affected by local operations and who are
likely to lack an alternative jurisdiction to receive services or govern themselves. A similar
concern may explain the courts' willingness to put some bite into their rational basis review.
Second, I see these cases as particularly embedded in the history and jurisdictional context
of American local governments. The longstanding state practice of providing for local finance through the property tax provides some justification for the extension of the franchise
to property owners. Similarly, the state practice of creating overlapping local units without a
sharp separation of powers or functions or a clear congruence of jurisdiction and impact
permits the extension of the franchise to those only modestly affected by a government with
technical jurisdiction over them. History and jurisdictional structure may provide some
guidance in determining when extending the franchise does not improperly dilute the "core
electorate's" interest in local self-government-although this is certainly not to reject the
enfranchisement of new "optional" electorates with a stake in local government activities.
See id at 322-30 (considering the enfranchisement of resident aliens in state and local
elections).
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rights.2 40 Nevertheless, given the current constitutional protection
of the franchise for residents without property, the extended
franchise may be a permissible recognition of the extent to which
the owners of property in a jurisdiction bear much of the economic
burdens of local government and, thus, have a cognizable stake in
the local political process.
IV.

THE MISSING MODEL OF FEDERATIVE LocAL GOVERNMENTS

The one person/one vote doctrine requires that representation
in governing bodies be based on population rather than on the political subdivisions of the government in question. Accommodating
state and local district lines to subdivision boundaries can justify
relatively minor deviations from population equality,2 41 but the
one person/one vote principle effectively dominates the representation of political subdivisions in state and local governing bodies.
The priority of population equality over the representation of
political subunits was dramatically confirmed by the recent decision in Board of Estimate of New York City v Morris,242 in which
the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated the one borough/one
vote rule of New York City's Board of Estimate. For most of the
city's twentieth-century history, the Board wielded broad authority
over land use and zoning, the disposition of city-owned property,

240

See, for example, Snead, 663 F Supp at 1085 (tracing the enfranchisement of

nonresident taxpayers in municipal bond referenda to earlier state constitutional provisions
that limited the right to vote to taxpayers). As my colleague Gerald Neuman has put it, the
enfranchisement of both residents, regardless of whether they own property, and nonresident property owners reflects "a melding of an earlier republican system in which traditional property qualifications defined the core electorate with the class-egalitarian conception of democracy" embodied in the rejection of property ownership as a qualification for
resident voting in Kramer and Cipriano. Neuman, 13 Mich J Intl L at 317 (cited in note
239).
Nonresident landowner voting may also be racially discriminatory. Fern Shen, Maryland Town Defends Another Era's Idea of Voting Rights, Washington Post Al (Mar 29,
1993) (51% of residents of town of Princess Anne are black; nonresident property owners
"who are primarily white" account'for 11% of the town's registered voters). The general
constitutional considerations that support state discretion to extend the franchise to nonresidents with a considerable property-based stake in the community might not be sufficient to
preserve such an arrangement if the enfranchisement of property owners is racially discriminatory in violation of the Voting Rights Act.
241 See, for example, Abate v Mundt, 403 US 182 (total deviation from population
equality of 11.9% constitutionally acceptable for county legislature in order to permit legislative district lines to correspond to the boundaries of towns within the county); Mahan v
Howell, 410 US 315 (1973) (total deviation from population equality of 16.4% in reapportionment of Virginia House of Delegates justified by the plan's advancement of state policy
of respecting the boundaries of political subdivisions).
242 489 US 688 (1989).
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and city contracts and franchises, while sharing power with the
City Council over the budget. The Board consisted of eight members: three officials elected on a city-wide basis, who cast two votes
apiece, and New York City's five Borough Presidents, who each
cast one vote.2 4 3 Given the wide disparity in population among the
five boroughs-with the largest borough having more than six
times the population of the smallest-the Board was an inviting
target for a one person/one vote challenge.244 New York City
presented a long list of arguments to justify borough-based representation on the Board, notwithstanding the considerable deviation from one person/one vote that resulted. Some form of borough-based representation had been virtually a constant in the
governance of the city since the consolidation of New York City
from the various pre-existing cities and unincorporated areas
around New York harbor in the late nineteenth century; borough
borders reflected natural topographical boundaries 245 and historic
political subdivision lines, 246 and were not the product of gerrymandering or manipulation; borough identity gave city residents a
sense of community hard to attain in a large metropolis, and borough equality on the Board contributed to the sense of borough
identity; and in a city of New York's size borough-based voting
provided desirable representation of subcity interests.2 47
There was certainly little evidence that equal representation
of the boroughs on the Board did much harm to the interests of
the residents of the larger boroughs. Unlike the rural-dominated
county legislature in Avery or the junior college district board in
Hadley, a majority of the city's population was able to elect a majority of the votes on the Board. There was no claim that the
smaller boroughs dominated the City, received more than their fair
243 Id -at 694.
244 Earlier efforts failed when the New York Court of Appeals found that the Board

lacked general legislative authority, Bergerman v Lindsay, 25 NY2d 405, 306 NYS2d 898,
255 NE2d 142, 146 (1969), and a federal district court ruled that the Board was not an
elective body but rather that its members were elected to other posts and served on the
Board ex officio. Morris v Board of Estimate, 551 F Supp 652, 656 (E D NY 1982). The
Supreme Court, however, concluded that the Board was elective because all eight officials
became members automatically upon their elections to their other offices, and that consistent with Hadley the Board's powers were "'general enough and have sufficient impact
throughout'" the City to require compliance with one person/one vote. Morris, 489 US at
694-96, quoting Hadley, 397 US at 54.
245 All but one of the borough borders is either a body of water or one of New York
City's external boundaries.
246 Each New York City borough corresponds to a county of New York State.
247 See Morris v Board of Estimate of New York City, 647 F Supp 1463, 1467-75 (E D
NY 1986).
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share of benefits, or bore less than their fair share of costs. If there
was ever a case for tempering the principle of population equality
with a sensitivity to local conditions and a willingness to allow a
locality to provide a minority with the greater representation it
may need to have its interests heard without seriously interfering
with majoritarian control, the Board of Estimate was the case. The
Supreme Court, however, rejected all considerations deriving from
the size and history of New York City or the political reasonableness of borough equality, finding that neither the Board's accommodation of "natural and political boundaries as well as local interests" nor the City's claim that borough representation is
"essential to the successful government of a regional entity, the
the "substantial departure from the
city of New York" could offset
24
one-person, one-vote ideal.

The unwillingness to compromise the equal population ideal
to permit the representation of public subdivisions may have two
consequences for local governments. First, it may impair the prospects for decentralization of power within an existing city. Neighborhoods or communities would have a stronger sense of identity,
and neighborhood or community governments could be more powerful, if they were represented directly in city governing bodies. 24 9
As one commentator has observed, New York City's system of
community boards with advisory and consultative powers concerning budgets, land use, and service provision is weakened because
the boundaries of community districts are not coterminous with
city council districts. The community boards are, thus, less able
"to provide a channel through which neighborhood activists make
their needs known to decision makers.-

50

With rigid adherence to

the one person/one vote doctrine, council districts cannot be
mapped onto community board lines, even though there are nearly
the same number of council districts and community districts,25
24S Morris, 489 US at 702-03.
2" Compare Nancy Maveety, RepresentationRights and the Burger Years 42 (Michigan, 1991) (discussing proposal to make districts in the House of Representatives coincide
with county or town boundaries within states to preserve representatives' "loyalty to their

state and its local communities").
Viteritti, The New Charter at 426 (cited in note 14).
21 There are 51 city council districts and 59 community boards. See Frank J. Mauro,
Voting Rights and the Board of Estimate: The Emergence of an Issue, in Frank J. Mauro
and Gerald Benjamin, eds, Restructuring the New York City Government: The
Reemergence of Municipal Reform 62, 67 (Capital City Press, 1989) (37 Proceedings of the
Academy of Political Science No.3); Robert F. Pecorella, Community Governance:A Decade
of Experience, in Mauro and Benjamin, Restructuringthe New York City Government 97,
97; NYC Charter §§ 22, 2702 (1988).
25
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because the principle of equal population representation requires
decennial reapportionment of council districts in light of population changes.2 52 Council-community coterminality would, therefore,
force the reshaping of community districts, but community districts are based on traditional neighborhoods or the city's service
delivery patterns 25 3 that do not ordinarily change with population
fluctuations. Neighborhood government requires stable borders
that correspond to residents' understanding of the territorial
dimensions of their communities. That would be disrupted if community districts were made coterminous with city council districts.
Equal population representation at the city level is thus inconsistent with council district/community board coterminality, and
that, in turn, may weaken the effectiveness of those community
governments.
Second, equal population representation may impede citycounty consolidations, regional governments, or similar efforts to
create governance structures capable of addressing metropolitan
area-wide problems. This was a central concern of the dissenting
Supreme Court justices in Avery and Hadley2 4 and of commentators at the time of those two decisions.2 55 For political reasons, the
creation of a regional government or the consolidation of a city
with the surrounding county may require the consent of the affected units. Residents of smaller units may fear that their voices
and their interests will be lost in a regional entity unless they are
given extra representation. Cities with traditions of home rule may
want additional representation in overlying regional units that may
limit municipal powers. 256 All participants may view the pre-existing local government as the primary focus of their interest in
local government and thus may seek to provide for representation
of the constituent local units in the regional entity. The inability
to create a federal structure in which the principle of population
equality is tempered by a concern for some parity among the preexisting units may render the regional unit politically impossible.
If, as is typically the case, the regional unit is less than a fully
consolidated metropolitan government, but simply the top layer of

252

See NYC Charter § 2703 (1988).

252 See, for example, NYC Charter § 2704 (1988).
25 Avery, 390 US at 486, 495, 509 (Harlan, Fortes, Stewart dissenting); Hadley, 397 US

at 59, 70 (Harlan, Fortas, Stewart dissenting).
255 See, for example, Dixon, 58 Georgetown L J at 971-85 (cited in note 13).
25
See, for example, Cunningham v Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 751 F Supp
885 (overrepresentation of City of Seattle and large cities with mayor-council form of government on the governing council of metropolitan area multi-purpose special district).
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a two-tier federation or a multi-purpose special district that leaves
many other local powers in the hands of the pre-existing local governments,2 5 it may, indeed, make more sense to think of the new
government in federal terms and provide for some representation
of the local units as local units. In addition, apart from the
problems posed by the desire to provide extra representation to
local units or to adhere to some goal of parity for pre-existing governments, the one person/one vote principle may make it difficult
to use component localities as districts for election to the regional
body because the local units are likely to have substantially different populations and reliance on political unit boundaries will often
create substantial deviations from population equality.
There were so few successful efforts toward elective regional
government in the decades immediately preceding the application
of the one person/one vote principle to local governments that it is
difficult to determine whether the inability to offer subunit-based
representation with deviations from population equality has contributed to the lack of movement toward regional government in
the past quarter-century. The Supreme Court's invalidation of the
one borough/one vote principle on the New York City Board of
Estimate and a federal district court's recent invalidation of the
overrepresentation of Seattle and certain other cities on the governing council of the Seattle metropolitan area multi-purpose special district,2 58 however, confirm the potential for the one person/
one vote doctrine to disrupt the creation of constituent units-based
elective regional structures.
There have been two structural efforts to reconcile the representation of constituent local units in regional governments with
the strictures of one person/one vote: appointive bodies and
weighted voting. Both approaches permit the creation of regional
governments based on subunits, but both also raise questions concerning the nature of the representation provided.
A. Appointive Bodies
The appointive solution is predicated on the exemption of appointive bodies from equal population representation. The courts
have treated the exemption as virtually tautological: The principle
of equal population representation is based on the constitutional

157

See, for example, Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis at 265-69, 311-21

(cited in note 79).
258 Cunningham, 751 F Supp 885.
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requirement of equal protection of voters; equal protection, in
turn, mandates equally weighted votes for all voters within a jurisdiction. If an office is not filled by popular vote, then the constitutional protection of the franchise does not apply,2" 9 and any challenge to a state scheme of subunit representation on an appointive
body would be subject only to a rational basis test and likely sustained under Hunter's principle of deference to state power to
structure local relations. 6 0 Although there may be some outer limit
on the state's power to provide for appointive local governments,2 6 '
the courts have consistently treated appointive bodies with members selected from component units of unequal population as exempt from the equal population representation principle.6 2
Two problems arise with the use of the appointive exemption
to create federative regional governments. First, as a descriptive
matter, it may at times be uncertain whether a body ought to be
treated as elective or appointive. This ambiguity may occur when

259

See, for example, Sailors v Board of Education of Kent County, 387 US 105, 110-11

(1967). Sailors involved the Michigan system for selecting county school boards, which involved local voters electing local boards, then the local boards sending delegates to a biennial meeting at which they voted, on a one local school board/one vote basis, for members of
the county board. The Court exempted the county school board members from the equal
population representation principle for a combination of reasons-the administrative nature
of the board, and the lack of a direct popular election for board members. "Since the choice
of members of the county school board did not involve an election and since none was required for these nonlegislative offices, the principle of 'one man, one vote' has no relevancy."
Id at 111. The Court's subsequent rejection of the constitutional relevance of the administrative/legislative distinction in Avery, 390 US at 482-83, and Hadley, 397 US at 55-56,
suggests that the crucial feature in Sailors was the absence of a direct popular election.
280 Compare Presley v Etowah County Commission, 112 S Ct 820 (1992) (Voting Rights
Act's requirement of preclearance of changes affecting voting does not extend to transfer of
powers from elected officials to appointed official) with Quinn v Millsap, 491 US 95 (1989)
(finding no rational basis for Missouri requirement that appointees to a board authorized to
draft a plan of reorganization for the city and county of St. Louis be landowners).
2I See, for example, Sheldon H. Nahmod, Reflections on Appointive Local Government Bodies and a Right to an Election, 11 Duquesne L Rev 119 (1972). But see Van
Zanen v Keydel, 280 NW2d 535, 539 (Mich App 1979) (evaluating the powers of the Huron%Clinton
Metropolitan Authority and finding that state could provide for the appointment of
the Authority's commissioners).
262 Compare Burton v Whittier Regional Vocational Technical School District, 587
F2d 66 (1st Cir 1978) (regional school district board based on modified one municipality/one
vote system in which city with 41% of population had only 2 of 13 seats sustained because
board members were appointed by the constituent municipalities) with Kelleher v Southeastern Regional Vocational Technical High School District,806 F2d 9 (1st Cir 1986) (elective regional school board in which town with 46% of district's population had only 20% of
the seats held unconstitutional). See also Oliver v Board of Education of City of New York,
306 F Supp 1286 (S D NY 1969) (invalidating plan for New York City board of education in
which five of seven members would be elected from the boroughs on a one borough/one vote
basis, while sustaining interim plan in which each borough president would appoint one
borough representative).

19931

One Person/One Vote

an important function of locally elected officials is to make ap-'
pointments to the regional body and when the locally elected officials themselves may be selected to serve on the regional body.2 63
The closer the connection between local election and regional appointment, the more the appointments from local units of differing
populations may be seen as an infringement of the right to an
equally weighted vote of the residents of the more populous local
unit.2 6 4 On the other hand, some close connection between local
election and regional appointments may be desirable to promote
the accountability of the regional officials and to enhance the public's participation in the affairs of the regional government.
This suggests the second, more normative, problein with appointive regional governments-the lack of a direct popular connection between the government and the region served. The desire
for some locally elective tie for regional officeholders may explain
the instances of elected local officials making appointments, or being eligible for appointment, to a regional board.2 6 5 In general, appointive officials will not be directly accountable to the public and
the public is likely to be less able to participate in the decisionmaking of an appointive body and less aware of its deliberations
and activities. An appointive body is probably less capable than an
elected body of building a sense of regional community among area
residents, of creating a consciousness of the region as an area with
shared interests and concerns, or of treating a region as a local unit
appropriate for self-government. 6 6 Moreover, an appointive regional body may have less power over the component local governments than an elective body would. The appointive body would

262 See, for example, Rosenthal v Board of Education of Central High School District
No. 3 of Town of Hempstead, 385 F Supp 223 (E D NY 1974) (upholding constitutionality
of system wherein voters elected members of boards of union free school districts and each
district board then selected two of its members to sit on the central board).
26'4 When New York City revised its charter to replace the Board of Estimate, it restructured its City Planning Commission to assure borough representation by authorizing
each borough president to make one appointment to the Commission. The charter sought to
attenuate the connection between the borough-elected presidents and the appointed Commission members and avoid the charge that the members were mere alter egos of the borough presidents by giving the members terms rather than have them serve at the pleasure of
the borough presidents. NYC Charter § 192 (1988).
26 See, for example, Moore v Wilson, 372 SE2d 357 (SC 1988) (district highway commissioner elected by county legislative delegations); Rosenthal, 385 F Supp at 225; Oliver,
306 F Supp at 1287.
266 But see John J. Harrigan and William C. Johnson, Governing the Twin Cities Region: The Metropolitan Council in ComparativePerspective135-37 (Minn 1978) (defending
the appointive nature of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council and criticizing proposals to
make the council elective).
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lack the legitimacy that comes from election, and, if the regional
members are selected by elected local officials, they may have less
stomach for a political confrontation with those to whom they are
beholden for their positions. Thus, appointive bodies provide a
way around the Supreme Court's restriction on the representation
of localities in federative regional governments, but at the price of
either weakening the effectiveness and legitimacy of those governments or of creating selection mechanisms that try to minimize the
appointment/election distinction that is the basis for the constitutional exemption of appointive governments from the equal population representation requirement.
B.

Weighted Voting

The other governance structure that may be able to reconcile
equal population representation with the election of representatives from political subunits is weighted voting. The Supreme
Court has indicated that the one person/one vote requirement does
not mandate election districts of equal population but can be satisfied by districts of different population as long as representation is
proportionate to population. 267 There are, however, several arguments that weighted voting is inconsistent with equal population
representation.
On the one hand, weighted voting may underrepresent voters
in the more populous districts. Legislators do more than cast votes.
They negotiate legislation, participate in committee activities,
oversee agencies, and perform constituent service. A legislator from
a large district may be given proportionately more votes than a
legislator from a small district, but she cannot engage in proportionately more activities, devote herself to the negotiation of proportionately more bills, or be in proportionately more places at the
same time. Even with weighted voting, constituents in large districts may not obtain representation proportional to their
numbers.6 8

217 See, for example, Abate, 403 US 182; Whitcomb. v Chavis, 403 US 124, 141-48

(1971); Kilgarlin v Hill, 386 US 120 (1967); Burns v Richardson, 384 US 73 (1966); Fortson
v Dorsey, 379 US 433 (1965).
2"8This problem could be ameliorated by the election at-large of a proportionate number of representatives from each local component of a regional jurisdiction. This solution is
also fraught with difficulty. First, like weighted voting, it raises the prospect of submerging
the interests of minorites. See text at note 277. Second, it may be difficult to make differences in representation as precisely proportionate to differences in population as one per*son/one vote requires when representatives are elected at large. With component units of
varying populations, interdistrict ratios may not be whole integers but, rather, fractions.
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On the other hand, weighted voting may overrepresent voters
in the more populous districts. This may occur because a district
represented by a single legislator entitled to cast a multiple vote
will have more voting power than a second district represented by
a number of legislators, each having one vote, who together can
cast the same number of votes as the representative from the first
district. The multiple representatives from the second district may
disagree and cast conflicting votes; but the single legislator with
multiple votes will cast all her votes in a bloc, thereby assuring the
first district greater voting power in the legislature than the second
district with the same number of votes.269 An example of how
weighted voting based purely on population can overrepresent
larger political subdivisions may be instructive. In nearly half the
governing bodies of New York State's counties, the town is the
2 70
unit of election, with town representatives given weighted votes.
Nassau County has five towns. Hempstead, the largest town, has
fifty-seven percent of the county's population. If the Hempstead
representative were given fifty-seven percent of the total votes,
then for any matter subject to majority decision the other representatives might as well stay home because fifty-seven percent of
the votes is equivalent to one hundred percent of the voting
27 1
power.

Consider a three-district jurisdiction with population ratios of 2.3 to 1.7 to 1.0. To comply
with one person/one vote, at-large elections would require either (a) electing some representatives who cast fractional votes (for example, giving the first district two representatives
who cast 1.15 votes apiece or three who cast 0.77 votes apiece) or (b) moving the decimal
point and electing a very large number of representatives at-large from each district, (for
example, 23 from the first district, 17 from the second, and 10 from the third.) The first
solution, however, recreates the possible under- or over-representation in the nonvoting aspects of representation which is the flaw in weighted voting since the individuals elected
would, of course, be integers even if they cast fractional votes: If the first district has two
seats on a five-member body its residents may be underrepresented in nonvoting matters
but if it has three seats on a six-member body its residents may be overrepresented. The
second solution would achieve proportionality in both the voting and nonvoting aspects of
representation, but such a large legislative body may be unwieldy at the local level.
'69 See generally William H. Riker and Lloyd S. Shapley, Weighted Voting: A Mathematical Analysis for Instrumental Judgments, in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds, Nomos X: Representation 199 (Atherton, 1968).
170 See, for example, League of Women Voters of Nassau County v Nassau County Bd.
of Supervisors, 737 F2d 155, 166 n 10 (2d Cir 1984) ("Of New York State's 57 counties
(outside of New York City), 24 employ weighted voting systems."). See generally Ronald E.
Johnson, An Analysis of Weighted Voting as Used in Reapportionment of County Governments in New York State, 34 Albany L Rev 1 (1969).
271 See, for example, Franklin v Krause, 32 NY2d 234, 344 NYS2d 885, 298 NE2d 68,
68-69 (1973). See also League of Women Voters, 737 F2d 155. Nassau County dealt with
this problem by giving Hempstead less than its population-based proportionate share of
votes on the governing board and by requiring a supermajority for the passage of all legisla-
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To deal with the bloc consequences of weighted voting, the
*New York State Court of Appeals has required that weighted votes
be based not on population but on voting power. A legislator's voting power has been defined as "the mathematical possibility of his
casting a decisive vote. ' 27 2 The Court thus requires a tabulation of
all the possible voting combinations on a county legislature and
the percentage of combinations in which any given legislator would
cast the decisive vote. The percentage of instances in which the
legislator casts the decisive vote must then be proportional to the
share of the population that legislator represents.1 73 This may
mean that representatives of larger districts get fewer votes than
population alone might dictate.7 4
Adjusting weighted voting to achieve proportional voting
power has, in turn, been subject to criticism for elevating a mathematical model over the realities of political life. Voting power models assume that all possible voting combinations are equally likely
to occur. That, of course, ignores the likelihood of other forms of
bloc voting-based on partisanship, race, issue cleavages, or other
factors-that may render the calculations of voting power highly
unrealistic. 7 In other words, without some consideration of voting
tion. Franklin,298 NE2d at 68-69; League of Women Voters, 737 F2d at 157-58. A federal
district court has recently invalidated the apportionment of the Nassau County Board of
Supervisors, noting that because of the supermajority requirement "the residents of Hempstead will forever be underrepresented on the basis of population in any vote taken." Jackson v Nassau County Board of Supervisors, 818 F Supp 509 (E D NY 1993).
272 Iannucci v Board of Supervisors of County of Washington, 20 NY2d 244, 282
NYS2d 502, 229 NE2d 195, 199 (1967). Iannucci builds on John F. Banzhaf HI, Weighted
Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 Rutgers L Rev 317 (1965).
273 Iannucci, 229 NE2d at 199. See also Greenwald v Board of Supervisors of Sullivan
County, 567 F Supp 200, 203 n 15 (S D NY 1983).
274 To deal with a subunit that has a majority of the population of the entire larger
community, there may be a need for a supermajority vote to pass legislation. See note 271.
276 In the Board of Estimate case New York City sought to use the voting power model
to defend the one borough/one vote rule because, in the City's calculations, the voting power
model suggested a lower degree of malapportionment than the pure comparison of borough
votes to population. The Supreme Court, however, treated voting power as "a mathematical
calculation that itself stops short of examining the actual day-to-day operations of the legislative body" and was sharply critical of the model's "unrealistic approach." 489 US at 69899. Some commentators have treated Morris's comments as the death knell of voting power
analysis and, ultimately, of weighted voting. See, for example, Richard David Emery,
Weighted Voting, 6 Touro L Rev 159 (1989); M. David Gelfand and Terry Allbritton, Conflict and Congruence in One-Person,One-Vote and Racial Vote Dilution Litigation: Issues
Resolved and Unresolved by Board of Estimate v. Morris, 6 J L & Pol 93, 111-13 (1989).
The New York courts continue to require that weighted voting plans be subject to a
voting power analysis and to treat weighted voting as a viable option for county government.
See Matter of Curcio v Boyle, 147 AD2d 194, 542 NYS2d 1009 (1989). A federal district
court recently concluded that "a weighted voting plan as it is presently utilized by the Nassau County Board of Supervisors" violates one person/one vote. Jackson, 818 F Supp at 531.

1993]

One Person/One Vote

power, weighted voting may overrepresent larger jurisdictions; but
mathematical analysis alone, without an examination of "the actual day-to-day operations of the legislative body," 27 6 may be unable to measure voting power.
Even if weighted voting could properly assure that subunit
representation is based on population, weighted voting raises the
prospect of submerging the interests of minorities within a
weighted voting jurisdiction. This is a concomitant of weighted
voting's single representative-bloc voting feature. Weighted voting
not only empowers larger blocs relative to smaller ones, it also
means that in larger districts one representative will be elected instead of many. In those jurisdictions, one jurisdiction-wide plurality will elect the single person who will represent the entire jurisdiction. As a result, geographically concentrated minorities who
might have been able to elect representatives from districts within
the jurisdiction will win none of the jurisdiction's vote when it
selects one representative on a jurisdiction-wide basis. When the
representation of racial and language minorities is so diluted,
weighted voting will be subject to challenge under the Voting
Rights Act.2 7
C.

Rethinking One Person/One Vote and Regional Governments

Appointment is unlikely to secure the accountability and legitimacy desirable for regional bodies, and weighted voting for elected
representatives may not satisfy the requirements of equal population representation. Should the demands of one person/one vote be
relaxed to accommodate the representation of subunits in regional
governments? This requires- consideration of the value of regional
governments and the nature of the one person/one vote doctrine.
There is certainly considerable theoretical support for the creation of regional units to deal with problems of regional scope.
The court determined that in Morris "the Supreme Court firmly rejected weighted voting,
not only because of the mathematical quagmire such a system engenders, but just as importantly because the methodology fails to take into account other critical factors related to the
actual daily operations of a governing body." Id. The court's opinion, however, also criticized the specific allocation of the votes on the Board of Supervisors and indicated that even
under a weighted voting/voting power analysis "the present configuration of the Board of
Supervisors violates the one person, one vote principle." Id at *29.
2'7Morris, 489 US at 699.
'7 Concern about the minority dilution features of weighted voting, and the consequent likelihood of a Voting Rights challenge, led New York City's Charter Revision Commission to scrap the Board of Estimate outright rather than maintain borough representation with weighted votes. See Mauro, Voting Rights and the Board of Estimate (cited in
note 251).
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Most metropolitan areas are fragmented into dozens, if not hundreds, of localities, while many of the problems that local governments address transcend today's local boundaries. Regional governments are more likely to have the institutional capacity, public
resources, and metropolitan perspective to provide those services-such as water supply, sewage disposal, pollution control,
and transportation-that need to be handled on an area-wide basis. Similarly, regional units could engage in the comprehensive
area-wide planning necessary to permit coordinated regional development, match physical infrastructure to population growth, and
determine the siting of regionally necessary but locally undesirable
facilities, as well as the location of amenities likely to be used on a
regional basis. 7 8 Election of the holders of regional offices could
enhance their accountability and mitigate the sense of loss of control that people might feel if regulatory power and responsibility
for the provision of services is vested in a unit more distant from
the local community.
Although at one time urban reformers pressed for the full consolidation of pre-existing localities into governments of metropolitan scope, these proposals drew little popular support and, indeed,
considerable resistance from local residents who feared loss of autonomy through absorption into a larger unit.27 9 As a result, advocates of regional units have generally abandoned the goal of full
consolidation and have instead developed proposals for "two-tier"
or "federative" plans that would move certain governmental functions to the regional level while reserving others to pre-existing local governments. 28 0 Further along the continuum from full consolidation are multi-purpose regional councils or special districts, like

278

See, for example, Note, It's Time to Create a Bay Area Regional Government, 42

Hastings L J 1103 (1991).
2" Most consolidation proposals require voter approval for adoption, and voters have
generally been resistant, particularly where there are significant economic or social differences among the communities proposed for consolidation. See generally W.E. Lyons, The
Politics of City-County Merger chs 1-3 (Kentucky, 1977); John E. Filer and Lawrence W.
Kenny, Voter Reaction to City-County ConsolidationReferenda, 23 J L & Econ 179 (1980);
Vincent L. Marando, City-County Consolidation:Reform, Regionalism, Referenda and Requiem, 32 W Pol Q 409, 411 (1979).
280 See Committee for Economic Development, Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas 19-20 (CED, 1970). The "two closest approximations" to the Committee for Economic Development's two-tier model are Miami-Dade County, Florida, which utilizes the
existing county as the basis for a metropolitan-level government, and Toronto, Canada,
which is a "true federative government." Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis at
318-21 (cited in note 79).
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the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council, 281 which oversees transit,
sewers, and regional park development in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
area, or the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, which was created to provide sewage disposal and transit services for the Seattle
metropolitan area. 2 81 The unifying theme in these various structures is the shift of responsibility for some services and some regulatory authority to the regional level, while preserving pre-existing,
smaller local governments and assuring them continuing autonomy
over a range of other functions.
The value of regional governance structures is certainly debatable, and many scholars question whether there would be improvements of service quality or cost. But even those scholars who find
the interests in efficiency and accountability better served by the
fragmentation of metropolitan areas into a multiplicity of small
units have primarily opposed full consolidation, not special districts of regional scope.28 Resistance to regionalization based on
the view that local governments ought to be scaled to the economic
and institutional needs of the services provided, and that most services can be effectively provided by relatively small units, 284 is consistent with the creation of multipurpose regional structures for
water, sanitation, pollution control, transportation, and other
problems that are best addressed on an area-wide basis.
Ultimately, the benefits of regional structures cannot be
proven-at least not with the level of certainty necessary to be a
compelling state interest-just as it cannot be demonstrated that
the election of regional officials on a constituent local government
basis is necessary to the creation of regional structure. The creation and design of regional bodies is a political process, based on a
state's policy preferences and its determination whether effective
and efficient service delivery and planning are better achieved
through regional institutions; whether such service delivery and

181See generally Harrigan and Johnson, Governing the Twin Cities Region 41 (cited in
note 266).
282 See Cunningham, 751 F Supp at 889-90. Currently, most metropolitan multipurpose

districts are appointive rather than elective bodies. The principal exception was the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, and its representation structure was held to have violated the
one person/one vote requirement. Id at 893.
183 See, for example, Vincent Ostrom, Robert Bish, and Elinor Ostrom, Local Government in the United States ch 4 (ICS, 1988); Robert Bish, The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas ch 5 (Markham, 1971).
284

The assumption is that the population needed for scale economies for most govern-

ment services ranges from 40,000 to 200,000, or much smaller than most metropolitan regions. See, for example, Howard W. Hallman, Small and Large Together: Governing the
Metropolis 192-93 (Sage, 1977).
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planning ought to accomodate the values of public participation
and accountability by making regional posts elective; and whether
the relationship between the regional and local governments would
be enhanced by basing representation in the regional government
on pre-existing local units.
Hadley and Board of Estimate indicate that the policy and
political concerns, that might lead to an elective, federative regional
government would not be sufficient to overcome the one person/
one vote requirement as it now stands. But both the uncertain theory of representation underlying one person/one vote and the unevenness of that doctrine's application to local governments suggest the possibility of new flexibility when regional local
governments are at issue. In terms of the theory of representation,
the issue requires a return to the debate between Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Stewart at the time the rule of equal population representation was adopted. Chief Justice Warren found that
the basic premise of representative government is majority rule
and that majority rule, in turn, mandates the equal weighting of
votes, otherwise the overrepresentation of some groups might reduce a popular majority into a legislative minority. A clear, quantitative rule-one person/one vote-was intended to prevent minority control. 285 Moreover, Chief Justice Warren dismissed the
significance of all interests other than population in measuring the
fairness of representation, writing that "[1]egislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms
'286
or cities or economic interests.
By contrast, Justice Stewart and the dissenters took a more
qualitative approach. They looked to the efficacy of different representation schemes under different circumstances, rather than to
the formal equality of voters. According to Justice Stewart,
legislators do not represent faceless numbers. They represent
people, or, more accurately, a majority of the voters in their
districts-people with identifiable needs and interests which
require legislative representation, and which can often be related to the geographical areas in which these people live. The
very fact of geographical districting ... carries with it an acceptance of the idea of legislative representation of regional
2 s7
needs and interests.
28" Reynolds, 377 US at 565-66.
286
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Moreover, the numerical equality of voters is not the only factor to
be considered in reviewing a representation scheme:
Representative government is a process of accommodating
group interests ....
[P]opulation factors must often to some degree be subordinated in devising a legislative apportionment plan which is
to achieve the important goal of ensuring a fair, effective, and
balanced representation of [] regional, social and economic
interests. ss
The variety of demographic, topographic, historic, economic, and
social interests in each jurisdiction suggests that a wide variety of
apportionment schemes be permitted. The only restrictions Justice
Stewart would have imposed are that a legislative apportionment
plan must not be irrational and must not "permit the systematic
frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate."2 8 9
Justice Stewart's position failed in the reapportionment cases.
Indeed, at a time when the focus of reapportionment litigation was
on the severely malapportioned, rural-dominated state legislatures,
his effort to combine some attention to population with group interests, qualitative factors, and local circumstances, and to require
courts to undertake a lengthy, multi-factored inquiry into the operations of the political process in each districting case, could have
been seen as an apologia for the perpetuation of malapportionment. The very specific "code"-like quality of one person/one vote
undoubtedly facilitated the process of uprooting past abuses and
preventing sharp deviations from population equality in the future
by giving lower courts and legislatures a relatively determinate
standard to apply.289 It may have also enhanced the legitimacy of
judicial intervention in the determination of political structures by
indicating that questions of representation could be resolved by a
relatively simple formal rule, rather than a complex analysis of the
variety of political, economic, social and cultural factors that go
into a determination of the fundamental fairness of a plan of representation. But the insight in Justice Stewart's analysis has been
borne out by the Supreme Court's and Congress's subsequent real2- Id at 749, 751.

289Id at 753-54.
219See, for example, David A. Strauss, The Role of a Bill of Rights, 59 U Chi L Rev
539, 540-48 (1992) (discussing the use of "a bill of rights... as a code that facilitates reform-a specific list of requirements or prohibitions to help break up traditional practices
that are in need of change").
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ization that numerical equality of voters and majority rule alone do
not guarantee fair representation. Indeed, one person/one vote is
quite consistent with districting that "fences out" or "dilutes" the
representation of minority groups, particularly racial and language
minorities 91 and weaker political parties.29 2 Population alone is
not the sole determinant of fair representation; the Constitution
and the Voting Rights Act also mandate attention to the representation of politically salient groups.
Of course, to say that population equality is not sufficient for
fair representation does not mean that it is not necessary to the
definition of fair representation. As Justice Stewart noted, surely
any constitutional representation scheme must prevent "systematic frustration of the will of a majority."2 93 Population equality
and majority rule are essential components of representation, but
they need not completely displace other factors that have traditionally been considered in representation schemes. Indeed, the local government franchise and representation cases indicate some
willingness to subordinate population equality to other political
values. The proprietary government, boundary change, and extraterritoriality cases all suggest that interests other than population
can be represented in local decisionmaking-economic interests in
the proprietary setting, and deference to state-created territorial
communities in the other cases. The Supreme Court has sought to
avoid balancing the values of equal participation and community
definition and preservation when they come into conflict by categorizing a case as presenting either an equal participation or a community definition question (but not both at the same time), but
the overlapping jurisdiction and extended franchise cases in the
lower courts suggest the possibility of reconciling the two values
without having one totally dominate the other.
A federative regional government differs from the other local
arrangements exempted from one person/one vote. Because it is
unlikely that the burdens of the government would be borne by
different subunits differently, the proprietary model is unavailable.
Residents of subunits subject to the regional government would
also, by definition, be residents of the region and, thus, the region
would be the jurisdiction for the application of strict scrutiny to
deviations from population equality. For regional governments
with less than the full powers of a traditional municipality where
291 See, for example, Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30 (1986).
292 See Davis v Bandemer, 478 US 109 (1986).
293 Lucas, 377 US at 753.

1993]

One Person/One Vote

the other powers are exercised by the pre-existing local governments, there might be some analogy to extraterritoriality and some
claim to viewing the regional government as a state instrumentality rather than as a local government. Indeed, even residents of
subunits getting less than their population's share of representation in the regional government would be doing better than the
residents of an extraterritorial zone because at least they would be
getting some representation. Ultimately, however, the analogy fails
because residents of the underrepresented subunits would be deftnitionally residents of the region in the way that fringe area residents were not residents of the core city.
What is needed, then, is a new model of federative regional
governments. Like the local self-government, proprietary, and state
instrumentality models, the model of federative regional government would reflect some of the basic descriptive features and institutional purposes of contemporary local governments. This model
would be based on a recognition that increasingly metropolitan areas are economically and ecologically intertwined and that many
local regulatory and service delivery problems are regional in scope
and cannot be adequately addressed by smaller political subdivisions. This model would also reflect the changes in the nature of
proposals for regional structures away from fully consolidated municipalities of metropolitan scope, which would be difficult to distinguish from other municipalities other than by size, toward
multi-functional special districts designed to address those
problems that require a regional focus while leaving pre-existing
localities in place and in possession of many of their traditional
powers. Moderating the stringency of one person/one vote for regional governments is less of a deviation from democratic norms if
the regional entity does not have plenary local authority but simply overlaps other local units. Limiting the model to entities of
limited powers overlapping pre-existing autonomous local governments would also be necessary in order to make a determinate distinction between federative governments and the general purpose
local governments subject to the full rigors of one person/one vote.
Finally, the model would recognize that states could reasonably determine that regional governments might be politically less objectionable to local constituents and that the accountability of regional governments and the continuing efficacy of pre-existing local
governments could be enhanced by basing representation at the regional level on local subunits.
Unlike the other models of local government that have shaped
federal constitutional protection of the local vote, the model of fed-
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erative government would seek to reconcile population equality
with the political and policy values of constituent local government
representation, rather than subordinate one concern to the other.
Smaller areas or incorporated subunits could be allowed to receive
greater representation than population alone might warrant as an
inducement to joining the regional entity. Similarly, greater deviations from population equality might be permitted than are currently allowed in order to use local government borders as districts
for election to the regional body. Bicameral regional institutions
might be able to combine some modes of representation based on
population with others based on local governments. The federative
model might make it easier to use weighted voting because the
claim that weighted voting fails to provide different districts with
representation exactly proportional to population would be less
compelling if population equality were not strictly required, although the difficulties inherent in assuring that weighted voting
provides fair representation would remain.9 4
Population would have to remain the baseline for evaluating
the fairness of representation. Certainly the "systematic frustration" of the interests of the regional majority would be inconsistent
with any view of a regional government as a democratically selfgoverning community. But rather than assuring mathematical exactitude and a precise matching of population to voting power on
the regional body, there should be greater deference to the state's
accommodation of the conflict between population and the representation of constituent communities. By analogy to the overlapping jurisdiction and extended electorate cases, deviations from
mathematical equality should be supported if they are justified by
some substantial interest related to the creation or operation of the
regional government and if neither a particular component locality
nor the regional majority is denied the opportunity to play a significantArole in shaping the policies of the regional body.29 5
legal standard that seeks to reconcile the representation
of
local communities with the representation of population would undoubtedly be more difficult to apply than one that gives primacy to
either value. Certainly, one of the strengths of the one person/one
vote test is its precision: for an elected body subject to one person/
one vote it is easy to tell whether the representation scheme passes

2"

A "federative defense" sufficient to repel a constitutional one person/one vote chal-

lenge might be inadequate to defend a weighted voting system against the claim that it
dilutes the representation of minorities protected by the Voting Rights Act.
295 See Section III.C.
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muster. And precision, in turn, promotes ease of implementation
and enforcement by lowering costs. But precision is achieved at the
cost of accuracy. Population equality is not the only factor relevant
to assessing the fairness of a representative scheme. As the local
government voting jurisprudence indicates, the special purpose of
the government, the policy judgment of the state, and the distinctive interests of autonomous political communities also contribute
to the determination of the appropriate representative scheme for
a particular locality. A model of federative government in which
population and local communities both have a place could be
doubly beneficial. As a practical matter it could facilitate the creation of elective regional governments. And as a theoretical matter
it could lead courts to deal more explicitly with the mix of concerns that go into measuring the fairness of representation.
CONCLUSION

The study of the one person/one vote doctrine at the local
level consists of two interrelated projects: the examination of local
government from the perspective of one person/one vote and, conversely, the examination of one person/one vote from the perspective of local government law. The first enterprise underscores the
multiple roles and conceptions of local government in our legal and
political structure while the second advances our understanding of
the uncertainties in the conceptual underpinnings of our dominant
theory of representation.
To study local government through the prism of the one person/one vote doctrine is to find clearly displayed the three principal models of local government extant in our legal culture-the
"polis," the "firm" and the administrative arm of the state.2 98
Much of the best contemporary legal scholarship concerning local
governments has emphasized the view of local governments as "little republics 2 9 7 which can serve as fora for citizen deliberation and
participation in public decisionmaking over a broad range of issues
of community concern. 9 8 Indeed, the initial application of the one
person/one vote doctrine at the local level in the cases from Avery
2" I have previously discussed the concepts of the "pols" and the "firm" in local government law in Richard Briffault, Our Localism-PartII: Localism and Legal Theory, 90
Colum L Rev 346, 392-435 (1990).
2" The phrase is Thomas Jefferson's. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams
(Oct 28, 1813), reprinted in L. Cappon, ed, H The Adams-Jefferson Letters 387, 390 (North
Carolina, 1959).
'2*See, for example, Frug, 93 Harv L Rev 1057 (cited in note 3);'Gilette, 86 Mich L
Rev 930 (cited in note 174).
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through Hadley relied upon and advanced the idea of local government as a miniature democratic polity. The Supreme Court's determination that the franchise and apportionment rules constitutive of democratic representative governments must also apply to
local governments was premised on a view of localities as locally
representative governments.
Yet the Court's subsequent decisions comparably underscored
the importance of the other roles, and other models, of local government. The special purpose district cases articulate a view of local governments as quasi-proprietary entities-landowner-controlled vehicles for financing the development and operation of
infrastructure that enhances the value of property. These cases
point to the historic economic functions, and economic constituencies, of local governments. They also remind us that
many-indeed, most-local governments in the United States are
not states-in-miniature, possessing broad decisionmaking authority
over an array of public services and issues, but are instead highly
specialized bodies, with powers narrowly limited to one or a few
service delivery functions. In that sense, the special district cases
can also be seen as a special instance of the continuing power of
the traditional state instrumentality model. Local governments are
not simply representatives of local constituencies but also function
as agents of the states, charged with delivering public services and
discharging state police power responsibilities locally. In shaping
one person/one vote to protect the state's decisions concerning local extraterritorial authority, the allocation of the franchise and
the aggregation of votes in local government boundary change elections, and the extension of the franchise beyond the core local electorate, the case law reflects the continuing power of the state instrumentality model.
Ironically, although the one person/one vote cases reveal the
multiple functions and conceptions of local government, doctrine
in this area tends to obscure the fact that the same governments
may combine two or all three of these roles. Infrastructure financing districts have political effects and serve proprietary functions,
much as extraterritoriality involves both local representation and
state administration. Yet the case law has denied this simultaneity
of function and, instead, has sought to categorize a particular local
institution or election as involving just one model of local government, without acknowledging the implications for other aspects of
local government that do not fall within that model.
The tendency toward categorization is understandable, however, given the absolutist nature of the one person/one vote doc-
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trine. As cases like Kramer and Hadley indicate, once an election
or an institution is deemed political, strict scrutiny of departures
from the one person/one vote rule follows. In the local democracy
setting, the proprietary or state administrative elements of general
purpose governments are also largely ignored. It would have been
difficult to preserve longstanding local arrangements like special
purpose districts and extraterritoriality if their local political aspects had been acknowledged, as the departures from one person/
one vote could hardly have survived strict scrutiny. The preservation of these traditional local institutions would require either that
one person/one vote be tempered by concerns in addition to population equality, or that categorical exemptions from the rigors of
the strict doctrine be created. The Court took the latter approach.
These local arrangements were, in effect, depoliticized, and their
voting and apportionment rules were held to have no implications
for local popular representation in local governance.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, this Article's second
project, the examination of the one person/one vote doctrine
through the prism of local government, is closely related to the
first. The local government cases highlight the uncertainties in the
theory of representation that undergirds the Court's doctrine in
the area of voting and apportionment. The extension of the local
vote to all otherwise eligible voters and the requirement of equally
weighted votes grow out of the presumption that all members of
the community interested in or affected by an election or a government have an equal right to participation in the election or the
selection of representatives in that government.
The unstated premise in the argument that interest or impact
implies participation is that all those interested or affected are interested or affected to a comparable degree. But what if a government has disparate degrees of impact on different members of the
community? The question may be sidestepped at the national or
state level; the extensive legislative, regulatory, and fiscal powers of
these governments support the inference that government action
has pervasive effects for all constituents throughout the jurisdiction. The significance of disparities in government impact is more
sharply presented at the local level where overlapping jurisdictions
and special purpose governments create situations in which different members of a community are, indeed, differently affected by a
particular local government's action.
The courts have dealt with disparities in local government impact by, for the most part, giving enormous weight to territorial
boundary lines and the categorical distinction between general and
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special limited purpose governments. The judicial approach has
been dichotomous, assuming, often somewhat disingenously, that
either all constituents are comparably affected by a local government or that those less affected by the government are actually not
affected at all. Thus, the relationship so central to the theory of
representation between difference in impact and the provision of
representation was never directly addressed.
The interplay of one person/one vote and the dominant models of local government also contributes to an understanding of the
place, or, rather, the absence of a place, for federative regional governments in current local government law, while raising anew the
issue of the role of population equality in measuring fair representation. The lack of an exemption from the rigors of one person/one
vote for regional governments points up both the lack of a model
of federative regional governments in the traditional thinking
about local governments and the displacement of territorial factors
by population in the contemporary definition of representation.
"Political" local governments-that is, those with some general
governmental powers and designed to be accountable to local electorates-are generally considered to be unitary, rather than federations of other, smaller localities. Local governments have long been
of regional scope, due to initial incorporation, annexation, or consolidation of pre-existing local units, but our legal system's experience with federative regional units, is relatively limited and generally recent. Yet surely there is a growing need to develop new
models of regional government which would preserve autonomy for
existing smaller units and also create larger political structures capable of addressing metropolitan land use, transportation, housing,
and environmental needs and remedying the damaging consequences of worsening city-suburb economic inequalities and social
disparities. 99 Federative local governments may be necessary to
meet that need.
A federative model of local government would also force further examination of our current basic assumption that fair representation means equal population representation. Federative governments give distinct representation to pre-existing component
governments, but the one person/one vote doctrine makes population equality the touchstone of representation and relegates the
representation of political subdivisions to no more than marginal
299 See generally David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs (Johns Hopkins, 1993) (attributing contemporary urban woes to the loss of middle class residents and tax base to suburbs
and urging, inter alia, measures that would create metropolitan jurisdictions).
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status. As cases like Hadley and Board of Estimate suggest, federative governments with more than minimal departures from population equality could not survive the current one person/one vote
rule. One person/one vote would, thus, appear to doom the federative model. However, as I suggested at the end of Part IV, federal
regional governments might actually provide the opportunity for
reconsidering Justice Stewart's contention three decades ago that
fair representation can encompass other political factors at odds
with strict population equality.
The equation of fair representation and population equality is
an artifact of our constitutional history. The Supreme Court addressed the respective roles of population equality and the representation of political subdivisions in litigation concerning the massive and longstanding overrepresentation of rural areas. In the one
person/one vote cases of the 1960s, representation of territory
seemed no more than a guise for the preservation of the political
power of a particular group. The strict formulation-of one person/
one vote was instrumentally necessary to break the anachronistic
hold of rural interests on the government of an increasingly urban
nation."' 0
The issue might be resolved differently if posed in the setting
of new forms of metropolitan government created expressly to deal
with contemporary economic problems and social conflicts of regional scope. Governance structures that combine representation
of regional population majorities with extra attention to the interests of component local governments-and, concomitantly depart
from pure equal population representation-might not be seen as
inherently negating fair representation but rather as part of the
complex process of reconciling the competing roles of population,
pre-existing communities, economic and social interests, and state
political and policy preferences.
The application of the one person/one vote requirement to the
political, proprietary, and administrative conceptions of local government raised questions concerning the relationship between the
impact of or interest in government action and the right to equal
representation in that government. So, too, the development of
federative regional governments would provide an occasion for
testing whether the one person/one vote rule is itself an essential
requisite of fair representation or, rather, whether states may be
allowed to modify the role of population equality to "achieve the
300 See, for example, Bernard Grofman, Voting Rights, Voting Wrongs: The Legacy of
Baker v. Carr 3-4 (Twentieth Century Fund, 1990).
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important goal of ensuring a fair, effective, and balanced representation of [ ] regional, social and economic interests."30 1
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